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Many buyer-seller interactions are characterized by asymmetric negotiation in 
which the seller makes explicit offers that the buyer either accepts or rejects. 
Asymmetric negotiations are prevalent in situations where the buyer is either reluctant 
or unable to make an explicit counteroffer. A common constraint that buyers face 
during negotiation is a purchase deadline, which causes the buyer’s opportunity cost of 
delay (negotiation cost) to increase over time. In turn, an increasing negotiation cost 
 v
causes the buyer’s minimum purchase threshold (reservation value) to vary over time. 
This dissertation proposes a new model of asymmetric price negotiation that allows 
buyers’ reservation values to change over time. The model reflects buyer decisions with 
respect to negotiation costs, the seller’s offer rate, a discount rate, and time.  
A dynamic structural model of asymmetric price negotiation is derived from the 
economic theory of search behavior that integrates findings from the behavioral 
literature. In particular, buyers are assumed to maximize their net present expected 
utility, but do so myopically over a short time horizon. Buyers evaluate a seller’s 
relative offer or the difference between the seller’s current offer price and a reference 
price. The model implies that the purchase hazard rate increases with time and 
negotiation cost, but decreases with offer rate and average relative offer.  
Model properties are empirically tested using a competing-risks proportional 
hazard model derived from the structural model. The empirical model is estimated on a 
sample of actual negotiations over the rental of a durable product; the results confirm 
the properties of the structural model. The empirical model is used to explore alternative 
specifications of the buyer’s reference price. It is shown that buyers tend to rely on the 
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1    Introduction 
 
  Negotiations are an important form of conflict resolution pervading a wide 
variety of social interactions. However, despite calls for more research on the 
negotiation process (e.g., Binmore, Osborne, and Rubinstein 1992; Gale 1986), few 
negotiation process models have been proposed (Balakrishnan and Eliashberg 1995). 
The extant negotiation literature is dominated by two perspectives. The behavioral 
perspective emphasizes the role of social perception regarding how negotiators 
selectively categorize, interpret, and infer information (Thompson 1990). This 
perspective identifies the antecedents of negotiation and the factors affecting the overall 
negotiation process. Alternatively, the economic perspective applies utility theory and 
game theory to predict equilibria for specific types of negotiations (Sutton 1986) and 
focuses on predicting negotiation outcomes. Unfortunately, neither perspective provides 
a unified theory of negotiation that incorporates important antecedents into a model 
predicting negotiation outcomes. Moreover, there is limited empirical support for 
economic models based on game theory (Ochs and Roth 1989; Rapoport, Erev, and 
Zwick 1995; Srivastava, Chakravarti, and Rapoport 2000). The model proposed here 
offers important insights into the limitations of outcome-oriented economics models 
while clarifying the role of different reference prices identified in the behavioral 
literature.  
The proposed model addresses negotiations between a single buyer and a seller. 
Before I describe the type of situations I will model, some terminology is required. A 
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negotiation is a process by which parties exchange information with the goal of 
reaching a jointly desirable agreement that prescribes future actions, behavior, or 
responsibilities. The process involves a series of offers and counter-offers between 
parties. An offer is a suggested agreement that at least one party finds desirable. A party 
to a negotiation is an individual or group that seeks a common outcome in accord with 
its preferences. The information exchanged may include provisional offers, stated 
preferences, or attempts to persuade the other party to change an offer or preference. A 
settlement is a set of required actions that the parties mutually agree to undertake upon 
completion of negotiation. Although the settlement is jointly desirable, each party has 
the option of exiting the negotiation at any time.  
Negotiations can be characterized several ways. A negotiation is monolithic when 
the parties represent their own interests and do not require ratification from a third party 
(Raiffa 1982). A negotiation is distributive when the settlement represents a division of 
some fixed available payoff whereby one party benefits to the detriment of the other 
party. A negotiation is integrative when the settlement that benefits one party is not 
made at the cost of the other party (Walton and McKersie 1965). Although there is no 
agreed upon terminology for the number of issues being negotiated, negotiations 
involving one issue will be called simple and those involving more than one issue will 
be called complex. When the outcome of one negotiation affects the outcome of another 
negotiation between the same parties, there is said to be linkage across the negotiations 
(Raiffa 1982). These negotiation characteristics are not necessarily exclusive, since 
more than one characteristic may be present during the same negotiation. 
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 The negotiation characteristics are illustrated by the following examples. When a 
husband and wife negotiate over where to go to dinner, the individuals typically 
represent their own interests; this represents a monolithic negotiation. This situation 
contrasts with a labor contract negotiation involving multiple parties in which 
representatives must seek ratification to reach a settlement. The negotiation between a 
husband and wife is often integrative, since a settlement that is advantageous to the 
husband need not be disadvantageous to the wife and vice versa. Again, this situation 
contrasts with labor contract negotiations which are often distributive since an outcome 
that is advantageous for labor (higher wages) usually represents a loss for management 
(lower profits). The husband and wife negotiation over where to dine is simple, whereas 
labor negotiations are usually complex, since they involve multiple issues such as 
wages, benefits, and work schedules. Since husbands and wives and labor and 
management have a continuing relationship with each other, there is often linkage 
across both types of negotiations. 
Negotiations between a buyer and a seller over the purchase price of a product or 
service exemplify many of these negotiation characteristics. The negotiations are 
simple, since they often involve only the purchase price, and are monolithic since the 
buyer and seller represent their own interests.1 Buyer-seller negotiations are distributive 
since a gain for the buyer (lower price) results in a loss to the seller (lower profit). 
Depending on the relationship between the buyer and seller, there may or may not exist 
                                                 
1 Although spouses and families often shop together and make joint purchase decisions, for the purposes 
of this dissertation they will be treated as a single party to the negotiation. 
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linkages across negotiations. Hence, buyer-seller negotiations are characterized as 
monolithic, distributive, simple, and with or without linkages.  
1.1 A Simple Conceptual Model 
One useful way to conceptualize the process of buyer-seller price negotiation is the 
Bargaining Zone model (Raiffa 1982). In this model, a buyer is interested in purchasing 
a single product from a seller. The buyer and the seller each possess some reservation 
price for the product. For the buyer, the reservation price b is the maximum price that 
the buyer is willing to pay for the product. Any price higher than b represents a situation 
at which the buyer is worse off than not settling. For the seller, the reservation price s is 
the minimum price at which the seller is willing to sell the product. Any price less than 
s represents a situation in which the seller is worse off than not selling. There are two 
possible situations. If b is less than s, the buyer is not willing to purchase at a price high 
enough for the seller and the seller is not willing to sell at a price low enough for the 
buyer. Consequently, there is no room for negotiation and no purchase takes place. If s 
is less than b, there is a region -- the Bargaining Zone -- within which buyer and seller 
reservation prices overlap. In this case, the parties are better off settling at some 
negotiated final price p between s and b than choosing not to settle. The difference p-s 
is the seller’s surplus and the difference b-p is the buyer’s surplus. Since the total 
available surplus, b-s, does not depend upon the final price p, this model represents a 
distributive negotiation. It is often assumed that during negotiation both parties seek to 
maximize their share of the available surplus. 
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Figure 1 




The Bargaining Zone model presented in Figure 1 provides a concise illustration of 
the problem that buyers and sellers face when negotiating. This conceptual model forms 
the basis for many economic theories of negotiation (cf. Nash 1950, Rubinstein 1982). 
However, the simplicity of this model belies an important characteristic of actual 
negotiations; the buyer’s and seller’s reservation prices may change over the duration of 
negotiation. Real negotiations involve dynamic changes in how the parties perceive the 
situation. In particular, a party’s reservation price may change over time as a function of 
pertinent factors such as the cost of negotiation or the rate at which offers are made. The 
proposed model in this dissertation is an attempt to rectify this deficiency in the static 
Bargaining Zone model.  
Seller’s Surplus                                    Buyer’s Surplus 
Bargaining Zone 
s                                              p                                               b 
Seller’s Reservation Price                  Settlement Price                        Buyer’s Reservation Price 
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1.2 An Illustrative Example 
By their nature, negotiations involve a dynamic process in which pertinent factors 
change over time. The dynamic nature of the negotiation process introduces several 
difficulties in specifying a model that reflects buyer behavior.2 This issue is particularly 
acute when a buyer faces a purchase deadline. For example, the buyer may face a 
deadline when purchasing airplane tickets, appliances for a new home, or items for a 
vacation. In this situation, the time spent negotiating represents foregone opportunities 
to purchase. As the deadline nears, the need to reach a settlement becomes increasingly 
urgent. This urgency is reflected in an increasing opportunity cost of delay. In this 
sense, the buyer faces an increasing cost of negotiation even if the transaction costs are 
fixed over time. In turn, the increasing negotiation costs will affect the minimum 
threshold or reservation value that the buyer uses as a basis for a purchase decision. In 
the face of an impending deadline, a buyer may adjust his/her reservation value to 
ensure that a suitable offer arrives in time. The complexity that a time-varying 
reservation value has on a buyer’s decisions during negotiation is illustrated by the 
following stylized example. 
 
John has just finished a business trip and has a few hours before his plane 
leaves. As an avid reader, he is happy to find a used book store near the airport 
that specializes in 19th century American literature. When perusing the books, he 
                                                 
2 In order to simplify the exposition of the proposed model, the terms “buyer” and “potential buyer” will 
be used interchangeably.  
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comes across the collected works of his favorite author, Henry James. The 
collection is priced at $140, but John thinks this is too expensive. John wants at 
least $30 off this price. Because John knows from prior experience that book 
dealers are often willing to negotiate price, he indicates to the dealer that he’d 
love to buy the Henry James collection, but $140 seems a little high. The dealer 
offers a new price of $130. John is excited about the $10 discount, but the new 
price doesn’t meet his minimum threshold of $30 off the initial price. John 
decides he wants to think over this decision for a little while so he thanks the 
dealer and walks across the street to get a cup of coffee. His plane is leaving in 
two hours, and he realizes that he needs to make up his mind soon if he wants to 
get the collection. Given enough time, John thinks he could get the dealer to 
agree to a lower price, but he realizes that he should adjust his minimum 
threshold to $20 off to ensure that he has enough time to make his plane if the 
dealer meets the new threshold. He walks back into the store and politely asks 
the dealer if he would consider a lower price. The dealer makes a new offer of 
$120 or $20 less than the original price. Since the new offer meets John’s new 
threshold, he buys the book collection and makes it to his plane just before 
takeoff. 
 
This stylized example illustrates the dynamic nature of price negotiation when 
buyers face a purchase deadline. In this case, John only had a few hours to spend 
negotiating or he would miss his flight. Although John’s instantaneous effort during 
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negotiation remained fixed, he faced an increasing opportunity cost of delay as his 
deadline loomed closer. This increasing negotiation cost influenced John’s decision rule 
for making a purchase. In particular, as John approached his flight time, he realized that 
he must adjust his minimum threshold or reservation value. Specifically, the time 
constraint forced John to adjust his minimum discount from $30 to $20 to increase the 
probability that the dealer would meet the reservation value within the remaining time. 
This example also illustrates the critical role of negotiation duration. Since the buyer’s 
reservation value depends on time, the buyer’s probability of choice will be time-
dependent. The goal of the model proposed in this dissertation is to capture the 
dynamics of a changing reservation value on a buyer’s decision making during a 
negotiation.  
1.3 Overview of Proposed Model 
The proposed model focuses on the same type of negotiation that John faced in 
the stylized example. John engaged in an asymmetric price negotiation where only the 
seller made explicit price offers that John either accepted or rejected. This type of 
negotiation characterizes many buyer-seller interactions in which the buyer merely 
indicates a willingness to consider a lower price, but only the seller makes explicit 
offers. Asymmetric negotiations are prevalent in situations where the buyer is either 
reluctant or unable to offer an alternative price because of comfort level or lack of 
requisite expertise to generate an explicit counteroffer. The proposed model reflects the 
buyer’s decision making over time in reaction to a sequence of offers by a seller. In the 
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stylized example, the model explains John’s time-varying minimum threshold for 
making a purchase with respect to his increasing negotiation cost, the seller’s offer rate, 
and time. In addition, although John’s negotiation occurred over a short duration, the 
model incorporates a discount rate that a buyer may use to value future offers. 
The proposed model integrates findings from the behavioral and economics 
literatures on negotiation into a structural model that captures the tradeoff between 
increasing negotiation costs and the expected benefit from negotiation. This structural 
model is derived from the theory of search (Flinn and Heckman 1982), but is 
augmented by important characteristics of actual negotiations (Blount, Thomas-Hunt, 
and Neale 1996) and decision making over time (Prelec and Loewenstein 1991). In this 
model, buyers exist in several states and transition according to choices that maximize 
utility during negotiation at each point in time. Buyers are assumed to be forward 
looking, but act myopically by only considering potential outcomes within a short time 
horizon. Furthermore, buyers are assumed to consider relative offers or the difference 
between the most recent offer and a reference price. Although these assumptions 
impose time-varying restrictions on the buyer’s choices, they enable the model to more 
accurately reflect the dynamics of actual negotiations than if these assumptions are not 
made.  
1.4 Research Questions 
The proposed model addresses three broad research questions: How does time, 
the buyer’s negotiation cost, the seller’s offer rate, and the average relative offer affect 
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the negotiation duration? How does the negotiation duration affect the buyer’s decision 
to purchase or exit negotiation? What reference price(s) do buyers rely on in evaluating 
a seller’s relative offer? These questions will be empirically addressed by estimating a 
reduced-form specification of the proposed model on a database of actual negotiations 
over the rental of a durable product.3 Since this database contains actual negotiations, it 
permits an evaluation of the external validity of the proposed model. This contrasts with 
prior research on negotiation that relies exclusively on simulated negotiations or purely 
theoretical models.   
The dissertation is organized as follows. This chapter provided a brief 
introduction to the research problem. In Chapter 2, the existing negotiation literature is 
reviewed, with an emphasis on work conducted in the behavioral, economics, and 
marketing literatures and on identifying the underlying approaches and constructs that 
are important in understanding the negotiation process. Chapter 3 introduces a static 
negotiation model based on search theory, and several extensions and modifications to 
the static negotiation model are introduced. The proposed model is presented in Chapter 
4. This chapter opens with a conceptual model of asymmetric price negotiation that 
integrates several findings from the economics and behavioral literatures as formal 
assumptions of the model. These assumptions are used to derive a structural model of 
the buyer’s decision making during negotiation. In Chapter 5, a competing-risks 
proportional hazard model is derived from the properties of the structural model. The 
competing-risks model is used to empirically validate several properties of the proposed 
                                                 
3 Due to the proprietary nature of the data, the product type, attribute names, and the company from 
which the database originated cannot be specified here.  
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model. This chapter provides a description of the database used to estimate the 
competing-risks model as well as the empirical results and tests of the propositions 
implied by the structural model. Chapter 6 presents a discussion of the implications of 
the model for the seller investigated, the limitations of the model, and extensions to the 











2    Literature Review 
The negotiation literature is dominated by two research perspectives. The behavioral 
perspective emphasizes the role of social perception regarding how negotiators 
selectively categorize, interpret, and infer information related to negotiation (Thompson 
1990). This perspective is descriptive, since it addresses the motivations and behavior of 
actual negotiations. Behavioral measures of negotiation include people’s judgments of 
the bargaining process, evaluation or liking of the other party, expectations of fairness, 
bargaining skill, and perceptions of negotiation goals. The primary focus of the 
behavioral perspective is on identifying the antecedents of negotiation and the factors 
affecting the overall negotiation process.  
The economic perspective applies utility theory and game theory to identify 
equilibria for specific types of negotiations (Sutton 1986). Utility theory assumes people 
maximize a function representing their preferences and risk attitudes for choice 
alternatives (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). Game theory formalizes situations 
in which each party’s welfare depends on the party’s own preferences and actions as 
well as on those of the other party (Luce and Raiffa 1957). Equilibria are outcomes with 
the property that neither party would be better off altering the terms of the outcome with 
respect to their own utility function. Hence, economic theory is normative in that if a 
person’s preferences satisfy certain axioms, the theory identifies choices a person 
should make. The primary focus of the economic perspective is on identifying optimal 
negotiation outcomes. 
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Most of the marketing literature on negotiation focuses on applications of economic 
negotiation theory. For example, there are several articles on applications of game 
theory to the study of channel negotiations between suppliers and distributors (e.g., 
Banks, Hutchinson, and Myer 2002; Iyer and Villas-Boas 2003; Srivastava, 
Chakravarti, and Rapoport 2000). A smaller stream of marketing negotiation literature 
tests the implications of game theory models for the outcome of buyer-seller 
negotiations (e.g., Curry, Menasco, and Van Ark 1991; Menasco and Roy 1997; Neslin 
and Greenhalgh 1983, 1986). However, with the exception of Balakrishnan and 
Eliashberg (1995) and Chen, Yang, and Zhao (2004), the marketing negotiation 
literature does not offer any new structural models of the negotiation process. One 
stream of marketing literature relevant to the proposed model reports research on 
reference prices. Several articles assess alternative specifications of a buyer’s reference 
price on their subsequent purchase probability (e.g., Briesch, Krishnamurthi, 
Mazumdar, and Raj 1997; Hardie, Johnson, and Fader 1993; Kalwani, Yim, Rinne, and 
Sugita 1990; Mayhew and Winer 1992; Winer 1986). 
Below, I focus on articles most representative of each research perspective and 
those offering important insights for modeling the negotiation process. I emphasize 
research identifying important factors that affect behavior and present models that 
reflect the social interactions characterizing the negotiation process. I conclude with a 
brief overview of the negotiation literature, highlighting strengths and weaknesses, and 
identify several contributions of the proposed model in light of the extant literature. 
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2.1 Behavioral Literature 
The behavioral perspective on negotiation contains a number of distinct theories 
related to a negotiating party’s social perception of the situation. These theories can be 
roughly classified into three groups (Thompson 1990). The first group includes theories 
about individual differences or stable characteristics of people that predictably affect 
negotiation behavior. Green, Gross, and Robinson (1967) exemplify this group research. 
They find that when a party with a high level of rigidity negotiates with a party of low 
rigidity, the former extracts a higher proportion of the available payoffs. Additional 
individual differences identified in this group include egocentricity (Corfman and 
Lehman 1993), cognitive ability (Pruitt and Lewis 1975), Machiavellianism (Huber and 
Neal 1986), perspective-taking (Neale and Bazerman 1983), and cultural norms 
(Graham, Kim, Lin, and Robinson 1988). Many of these individual differences require 
specialized measurement instruments and thus would be difficult to operationalize 
outside of a laboratory setting.  
The second group of behavioral theories includes research identifying 
motivational factors, such as a party’s aspirations, goals, and expectations. For example, 
several authors show that expectations of fairness affect negotiation behavior. Maxwell, 
Nye, and Maxwell (1999) find that buyers primed with an expectation of fairness settle 
more often and more quickly than unprimed buyers. Luft and Libby (1997) find high 
expectations of fairness yield equitable settlements. Negotiator goals can also affect the 
negotiation process. In channel negotiations, McAlister, Bazerman, and Fader (1986) 
show that the effect of moderately high profit goals on negotiator performance depends 
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on the power relationship between the parties. In particular, a party with a moderately 
high profit goal acquires a higher profit only when the party exhibits more power 
compared to the other party.  
The third group of behavioral theories includes cognitive theories of how parties 
perceive the negotiation situation, process the available information, and make 
judgments. An important issue in this stream of research is how the parties frame the 
negotiation process and the possible settlements. For example, Thomas and Hastie 
(1990) show that parties sometimes assume there is conflict when none exists 
(incompatibility error). This error can lead to settlements in which both parties are 
worse off than if they negotiated without the assumption of conflict. Neale and 
Bazerman (1983) find that one party sometimes assumes the other party has the same 
preferences and prioritizes the outcomes equivalently (fixed-pie error). This error can 
lead to a distributive settlement even when an integrative outcome is feasible. Several 
authors identify the effect of perceived negotiator roles. For example, a party with the 
perceived role as “buyer” often acquires a greater payoff than the “seller” (Eliashberg, 
LaTour, Rangaswamy, and Stern 1986; Huber and Neale 1986; McAlister et al. 1986; 
Neale and Northcraft 1987). Finally, offers often are correlated with a reference price. 
For example, White and Neale (1994) show that the settlement price is highly correlated 
with the price a party would like to pay (aspiration price).  
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2.1.1 Prospect Theory 
An important behavioral theory used in the proposed model draws on Prospect 
Theory. Although Prospect Theory is not a theory of negotiation per se, several facets 
of this theory are relevant to the study of negotiation (and are used in the articles cited 
above.) Prospect Theory explains how people perceive gains and losses with respect to 
individual reference points (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979). This theory explains 
certain observed systematic departures from the normative utility theory of economics. 
For example, consumers often value the purchase price of a product with respect to a 
reference price, evaluating the price as a “gain” if it is priced less than their reference 
price and a “loss” if it is priced greater than their reference price (Winer 1986). 
Reference price effects have been identified in consumer price negotiations for the 
purchase of a house (Northcraft and Neale 1987).  
Prospect Theory rests on three key assumptions. First, there exists a reference 
point from which an individual’s choices are perceived by that individual as either a 
gain or a loss. The reference point may be different across individuals. This suggests 
that the same choice can be perceived as a gain for one person, and perceived as a loss 
by someone else. For example, a buyer may perceive a purchase as a loss since the 
buyer pays (“loses”) money , whereas a seller may perceive the same choice as a gain, 
because the seller profits from the sale (Neale et al. 1987). Second, Prospect Theory 
assumes that the marginal value of gains is decreasing and the marginal value of losses 
is increasing. This assumption implies that people are risk-averse in the choices 
between gains, but are risk-seeking when choosing between losses. Third, the theory 
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assumes that the perceived change in value between gains is less than the perceived 
change between losses, an effect known as loss aversion. These three assumptions are 
represented by a value function that specifies preferences and risk attitudes in a way 
similar to a utility function. Figure 2 below illustrates an idealized value function that 
displays the characteristics implied by the three assumptions of prospect theory.  
The importance of Prospect Theory to the study of negotiation is evidenced by 
several articles that show how a buyer’s reference price affects the negotiation 
settlement. For example, Northcraft and Neale (1987) find that buyers often use the 
initial list price as a reference price in negotiating the purchase price of a house. White 
and Neale (1996) show that the average selling price of a brand affects the final 
negotiated price of that brand. In the context of dyadic negotiation over the purchase of 
a home, White, Valley, Bazerman, Neale, and Peck (1994) show that the average selling 
price of other homes significantly affects the purchase price. These examples 
demonstrate the importance of considering the effect of reference price on a buyer’s 
decision making during negotiation. Reference prices will play a crucial role in the 
proposed model. I will return to this topic in the discussion of the marketing literature. 
Figure 2 shows the effect of gains and losses on a person’s value function, 
denoted by V. The reference point is depicted by the origin, with losses on the negative 
side and gains on the positive side of the origin. Risk-aversion is illustrated by the 
concave downward shape of the graph in the gains region. Risk-seeking is illustrated by 
the concave upward shape of the graph in the loss region. Loss aversion is shown by the 
greater slope in the loss region compared to the gain region of the graph. Consequently, 
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the absolute value of V at “a” is less than the absolute value of V at “-a”, or 
. Hence, a person will value a loss greater than a gain of the same 
amount. For example, if the value function is defined over prices, then a person will 
perceive a larger change in value for a decrease in price of $a compared to an increase 
in price of $a, with respect to their reference price. This effect of loss aversion has 
important implications for how buyers value offers made during negotiation. In 
particular, a buyer may react more strongly to an offer that is a decrease with respect to 
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-a         a 
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2.2 Economics Literature 
The economic perspective applies utility theory and game theory to identify 
equilibria for specific types of negotiations (Sutton 1986). Utility theory assumes that 
people maximize a function representing their preferences and risk attitudes for choice 
alternatives (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). Game theory formalizes situations 
in which each party’s welfare depends on the party’s own preferences and actions as 
well as those of the other party (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995). An 
equilibrium is an outcome with the property that neither negotiating party would be 
better off altering the terms of the outcome with respect to its own utility function. 
Hence, economic theory is normative in that if a negotiating party’s preferences satisfy 
certain axioms, the theory identifies the choices that the party should make. The 
primary focus of the economic perspective is to identify negotiation outcomes that are 
equilibria for particular types of negotiations. 
Historically, the economics negotiation literature contains two broad perspectives on 
how a party maximizes utility. Early process theories of negotiation assume a party only 
maximizes utility with respect to that party’s preferences. In contrast, game theory 
allows a party to maximize utility with respect to its own preferences as well as its 
beliefs about the preferences of the other party involved in the negotiation. In game 
theory, a party’s strategy during negotiation is a best response to beliefs about the other 
party’s actions. Although the early process theories have fallen out of favor, they are 
relevant to the model proposal in this dissertation because they focus on explaining the 
negotiation process rather than the outcome.  
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In the earlier process theories, the primary focus was to understand why a party 
would make a concession from an initial offer, since a concession would imply taking a 
position of lesser utility. Consequently, early process theories tended to focus on the 
sequence of offers and counter-offers (i.e., concessions) made between negotiation 
parties. This approach proved problematic, because many of the process-oriented 
models could not predict the value of the final settlement (or if a settlement was even 
possible!). Game theories overcome this deficiency by formalizing the negotiation 
process through a set of axioms that specify the allowable negotiation behavior. In this 
way, by an appropriate choice of axioms, game theory guarantees that a settlement is 
feasible and predicts its value. Game theories also allow parties to engage in more 
realistic decision making, since utility maximization is conditional on both parties 
preferences and their beliefs about each other’s preferences.  
 In formalizing the negotiation process, game theories have largely abandoned the 
initial interest in studying the negotiation process. Consequently, the game theory 
perspective is fundamentally limited in what it can explain and predict about the 
negotiation process because the process is “fixed” by a set of axioms or stipulations.4 
Despite this shortcoming, I will provide a brief overview of the main theories and 
features of both the early process models and several game theories with the goal of 
emphasizing aspects of each that provide insights on how best to specify a dynamic 
model the negotiation process. 
                                                 
4 In their defense, some game theorists maintain that formalization of the negotiation process is necessary 
in order for their models to be relevant to a broad range of possible processes (Sutton 1986). 
Unfortunately, the practice of game theory has at times introduced formalizations of the process that have 
proved unrealistic in empirical tests (Ochs and Roth 1989).  
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2.2.1 Early Process Models 
A negotiation can be characterized by a series of concessions culminating in a 
settlement representing a compromise among the offers. If a party’s utility decreases 
with each concession, an important issue to explain is why the parties would ever 
concede. Several models address this issue by introducing the notion of bargaining 
power or the advantage of accepting or rejecting an offer. Bargaining power restores the 
basic utility maximization framework for explaining negotiation behavior because 
parties are assumed to maximize utility weighted by bargaining power. The research 
presented below is also noteworthy because it identifies several important 
characteristics of the negotiation process that will prove important in my subsequent 
model. Zuethen (1930) provides the earliest model to explain concession making in 
terms of bargaining power.5 This model is developed using the following example. 
Suppose two parties are involved in a negotiation over two possible settlements, A1 and 
A2. The utility functions for Party 1 and Party 2’s are respectively denoted by  and 
. Party 1 prefers A
)(1 ⋅U
)(2 ⋅U 1 over A2 and Party 2 prefers A2 over A1. Suppose Party 2 offers 
Party 1 the settlement A2. Zeuthen proposes that the decision by Party 1 to counter-offer 
with A1 depends on Party 1’s assessment of the probability, , that Party 2 would 
reject this offer and choose not to settle. Party 1 faces the choice of obtaining  
with certainty or obtaining with probability
2p
)( 11 AU
)( 21 AU )1( 2p− . Since the parties maximize 
utility, Party 1 will accept A2 if: 
                                                 
5 The explanation of Zuethen’s model presented here is due to Harsanyi (1956).  
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Zuethen argues that the maximum value of the left-hand term in equation (1) represents 
the greatest “risk” that Party 1 would face in order to achieve A1. Party 2 faces a similar 
situation. The maximum risk each party is willing to face to achieve its most preferred 
outcome represents each party’s bargaining power.6 Therefore, Zeuthen argues that a 
party will make a concession when the other party’s bargaining power is stronger.7  
There are several noteworthy features of Zuethen’s concession model. First, the 
choice to concede and the amount of bargaining power are determined solely by each 
party’s assessment of its utility. Second, although the model provides conditions for a 
concession, it provides no mechanism for predicting the concession value. For example, 
in negotiations over price, the model does not provide a way to predict the sequence of 
offer prices made by the parties. Third, the model assumes that each party knows the 
other party’s utility (i.e., there exists perfect information) and that the utilities are 
comparable (i.e., cardinal utility functions). These assumptions limit the applicability of 
Zuethen’s model. In particular, it may unreasonable to assume that in a buyer-seller 
negotiation both parties know each other’s preferences.  
                                                 
6 This terminology is due to Harsanyi (1956) 
7 Harsayni (1956) shows that this process will eventually lead to a settlement at the midpoint between the 
original offers. 
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Despite these shortcomings, Zeuthen’s model provides a key insight into the 
negotiation process. Namely, each party considers the probability the other party will 
accept an offer. In choosing an offer, a party maximizes utility conditional upon the 
likelihood the other party accepts the offer. Since this probability depends on the other 
party’s utility, Zuethen’s model implicitly assumes that a party takes into consideration 
beliefs about its opponent’s likely response to an offer. This feature will prove useful in 
my proposed model. 
Cheng (1968) offers a model of concession that predicts the concession values and 
offers further insight on how bargaining power impacts the choice to concede. The 
model closely resembles that of Zeuthen (1930). To illustrate Cheng’s approach, again 
consider the example in which Party 2 offers  to Party 1 and Party 1 considers the 
counter-offer . Cheng argues that if bargaining power is defined as in Zuethen’s 
model, then a concession by one party may reduce both parties’ bargaining power. 
Hence, it is unclear when a party would concede. Cheng proposes that bargaining power 
should be defined in relative terms, or that bargaining power should be standardized 
with respect to the total amount of power of both parties. This modification provides 
Cheng with a justification for interpreting bargaining power as the probability that a 
party’s offer will be accepted.  
2A
1A
Cheng models the concession as the maximum of a party’s expected utility with 
respect to its bargaining power. For example, if is the relative bargaining 




Party 1 chooses an offer x that maximizes expected utility or solves 
. Party 2 maximizes a similar expression, given Party 1’s current 
offer of . This process continues until the expected utility of each party’s optimal 
current offer equals the certain utility of accepting the other party’s optimal offer.  
)(*)|(max 121 xUAxPx
1A
The primary contribution of Cheng’s model is its ability to predict the concession 
value by interpreting bargaining power as the probability of acceptance. However, the 
model suffers from many of the same limitations as Zeuthen’s model, such as the need 
for perfect information and the existence of interpersonal utility comparisons. Also, it is 
not clear that bargaining power is equivalent to the probability of acceptance or that the 
proposed process converges to a settlement.8 Nonetheless, the model provides a useful 
conceptualization of the negotiation process in terms of utility maximization with 
respective to bargaining power and the probability of acceptance.  
Cross (1965) provides a further improvement over the models of Zuethen and 
Cheng. He argues that concession making is motivated by a desire to minimize utility 
loss that occurs as the value of settlement erodes over time. For example, in buyer-seller 
negotiations, the utility of the good being negotiated may decrease over time due to a 
limited shelf-life, competitive entry, or changing preferences. Cross argues that time has 
a threefold impact on the negotiation process. First, future outcomes are discounted for 
time. The longer the negotiation process takes, the longer it will take to realize a gain. 
The present value of a distant gain is less than a current gain. Second, utility changes 
                                                 
8 In fact, Cheng notes that a settlement is guaranteed only when the utility comparison is expressed as a 
linear function. 
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over time. This implies that the party’s reservation values will change over the 
negotiation duration. Finally, there are negotiation costs that accrue over time. These 
costs include the effort involved to negotiate and the opportunity costs associated with 
not pursuing alternative settlements. 
Since the present value of a future outcome is a function of the time it takes to 
realize the outcome, Cross argues that the parties estimate the time to settlement as part 
of their utility maximization. However, Cross does not assume that the parties have 
perfect information or that they can make interpersonal utility comparisons. Instead, he 
argues that each party makes an initial estimate of the other’s party’s rate of concession 
and updates this estimate with the actual rate of concession observed during negotiation. 
Hence, Cross’s model only depends on the ability of each party to learn the other 
party’s concession rate.  
Cross proposes the following model to capture the sequence of concessions made 
during negotiation. Suppose two parties negotiate over a divisible good whose total 
quantity is M. Let  and denote the quantity demanded by each party, respectively. 
Negotiation involves dividing the difference
1q 2q
Mqq −+ )( 21 . Let )(1 ⋅U  represent Party 
1’s utility and denote Party 1’s estimate of Party 2’s concession rate. Let T denote the 







MqqT −+= . Let 
denote Party 1’s fixed cost of negotiation during each time period and let denote 
the discount rate for and . Cross assumes that discounting is exponential, so that 
1C 1a
)(1 ⋅U 1C
the discounted utility at time T for is given by , and the total cost of 1q
aTeqU −)( 11
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negotiation is given by )()( 1 aTe
CTC −−= . Consequently, Party 1 chooses q  th




nt value of utility:  





CeqUqU −− −−= . 
 
Party 2 faces a similar utility maximization problem. Cross proposes that a settlement 




 learning takes place, providing 
only fir
s 
occurs when the party’s demands equal the available surplus or when Mqq =+ 21 .  
 Cross’s model offers several contributions to an understanding ion
is the first model to incorporate the effect of time discounting on the negotiation 
process. If there is no cost associated with negotiation, then the parties would 
continually change their bargaining power ad infinitum without ever reaching a
settlement. Second, Cross’s model provides a mechanism for estimating each pa
sequence of offers in terms of the estimated rate of concessions of both parties. Note 
that in estimating the other party’s concession rate, Cross does not assume that a party
has knowledge of the other party’s utility function.  
Unfortunately, Cross leaves open exactly how
st order conditions that a learning function should satisfy. For example, Cross 
argues that if Party 2’s actual concession rate is faster than Party 1’s expectation of thi
rate, then Party 1 will increase the value of its expectation, and the amount of increase 
will depend on the size of the difference between the actual and expected concession 
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rates. Cross does not provide an exact specification for how the updating occurs. Befo
I explain some possible remedies to Cross’s model, I turn next to a brief description of 
more recent theories of negotiation.  
re 
2.2.2 Game Theory Models 











me” is any situation in which each party’s welfare depends on the party’s own 
preferences and actions as well as those of the other party (Luce and Raiffa 1957). 
game theory model of negotiation (“bargaining problem”) specifies a set of axioms 
governing conduct, the payoffs to each party, and possible strategies. The set of 
strategies that are best responses to each other are called a Nash equilibrium. A s
to a bargaining problem is a rule specifying the Nash equilibrium of the game. A central 
focus of game theory is to derive conditions that guarantee certain properties of a 
solution (e.g., existence of a unique Nash equilibrium). Consequently, game theory
focuses on the negotiation outcome(s), given specific types of negotiation processes.
Fundamentally, a game theory model takes the process as given and seeks outcomes 
that result from the specified process. 
Two types of game theory models 
dels, negotiation is assumed to satisfy several a priori axioms. Cooperative models 
usually have a unique equilibrium expressed as the maximum of some function of the 
individual’s utilities. In non-cooperative models, the negotiation process is assumed to
follow a specific sequence and the parties act in response to the information available to
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them at a point in time. Non-cooperative games may have more than one equilibrium 
solution, depending on the information each party is assumed to possess at the start of 
negotiation (e.g., information about the other party’s preferences). Although the 
approaches to cooperative and non-cooperative games differ in many ways, the tw
perspectives can be viewed as complementary with respect to their explanation of 
negotiation outcomes (Sutton 1986).  
Most game theory models of barga
o 





e theory model of negotiation is Nash’s Bargaining Model 
(Nash 1950). This model is notable both in its simplicity and in its widespread use as a 
 bargaining process (Thomson 1994). Two or more parties have access to a set of 
alternatives called the feasible set, denoted by S. The parties have different preference
for the alternatives in S. If the parties come to an agreement, they both will receive a 
settlement in S. If the parties do not agree, they each obtain a pre-specified alternative
called the conflict point, denoted by c (which is also in S). The parties’ preferences for 
the alternatives and the conflict point are captured in their utility functions. The 
bargaining solution is a prediction of the settlement, given a set of axioms dictati
behavior of the parties. The axioms may be interpreted as a set of normative objectives 
of fairness that the parties each obey during the negotiation process. Hence, different 
sets of axioms embody alternative rules of conduct that the parties are thought to 
operate under during negotiation. The principle models and results from both 
cooperative and non-cooperative game theory traditions are presented next.  
2.2.2.1 Cooperative Games 





to an affine 
ansformation. 
endence of Irrelevant Alternative (IIA): If 
ss
chmark in subsequent research. An important factor influencing a settlement in 
Nash’s model is the existence of a conflict point or an outcome arising from no 
settlement. The parties use the conflict point to value possible outcomes. Nash’s mo
is based on the following axioms thought to characterize bargaining. In the state
these axioms, S is the feasible set, and F(S) is the settlement of S. 
 
(Axiom 1) Cardinal Utilities: Each party’s utility is unique up 
tr
(Axiom 2) Symmetry: The settlement is valued the same for all parties. 
(Axiom 3) Indep SS ⊆'  and ')( SSF ∈ , 
then )()'( SFSF = . 
(Axiom 4) Pareto-Optimality: }|{)()( SsSsSPOSF ',' ∈∀≥∈=∈ .9
 
atisfies these assumptions, then there is a unique 
quilibrium. This outcome is the solution maximizing the product of each party’s utility 
wit
li t gives 
                                                
Nash shows that if negotiation s
e
h respect to its conflict point. In particular, if the i-th party’s utility is iU  and the 
utility of no settlement is ic , then the Nash Bargaining Solution is the maximum 
of ( )( )−− . In the case where the parties negotiate solely over price and each 
party’s utility for the conf ct point is zero, then the settlement is the outcome tha
2211 cUcU
 
9 Note that Axiom 4 implies every negotiation ends in a settlement other than the conflict point. The fact 
that many actual negotiations often end with no settlement suggests that Axiom 4 may not be 
characteristic of actual negotiations. 
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eac  profit. Hence, the Nash Bargaining Solution can be interpreted as 
emphasizing the party’s concern for equity in the outcome (Corfman and Gupta 1993).  
Several alternatives to Nash’s static bargaining model have been proposed. Each 
alternative results from “relaxing” or altering one or more of the four axioms in Nash’s 
h party the same
mo
ility 
del. Similar to the Nash model, these alternatives derive an equilibrium solution 
based on a particular negotiation process. Harsanyi (1955) replaces Axiom1 with the 
assumption that utilities are ordinal, and the parties are able to make interpersonal ut
comparisons. This seemingly innocuous alteration changes the bargaining solution to 
the maximum of 21 UU + . Kalai-Smordinsky (1975) replaces Axiom 3 with the 
assumption of Individual Monotonicity.10 The solution to the Kalai-Smordinsky 




1 cUk −= . Geometrically, the Kalai-Smordinsky solution is the Pareto-optim
lly, Gupta and Livne (1988) replace the conflict point with any referen
point that is Pareto-superior to the conflict point, but not to the settlement. Gupta and 
Livne’s solution is represented geometrically as the Pareto-optimal point on the line 
connecting the reference point to the ideal point. Figure 3 provides a geometric 
interpretation of these cooperative game theory models of negotiation. 
cUk −
al 
point that lines on the line connecting the conflict to the ideal point (or pair of maximal 
utilities). Fina ce 
                                                 
10 Individual Monotonicty is the assumption that if the feasible set S is enlarged to S’ such that for every 
payoff to Party 1, the range of feasible payoffs to Party 2 is increased, then Party 2’s final payoff in S’ 
should be at least as large as Party 2’s payoff in S (Corfman and Gupta 1993) 
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Although the cooperative bargaining models abstract away from the negotiat







 characteristics of the negotiation process 
wable behavior by the parties. However, non-
.g., only 
                                                
ations for which the models are applicable, they may be interpreted as conditions 
under which the proposed bargaining solutions might occur. For example, the Nash 
Bargaining Solution provides for an equitable settlement when there are cardinal 
symmetric utility functions satisfying the IIA property. Hence, actual settlements tha
are not equitable may result from negotiations that fail one of the assumed propert
(e.g., symmetry). Second, the unique solutions provide testable benchmarks for 
evaluating an empirical model of negotiation.11 Cross (1965) shows that when both 
parties have the same discount rate and conflict point, the outcome of his model 
equivalent to the Nash Bargaining Solution.  
2.2.2.2 Non-Cooperative Games 
Non-cooperative games attempt to incorporate
into the axioms that prescribe allo
cooperative games often do not have a unique Nash equilibrium. Instead, sequential or 
subgame perfect equilibria are sought that represent a subset of credible Nash 
equilibria. Within non-cooperative games, there is a distinction between games that 
assume complete information and those that assume incomplete information (e
 
11 In fact, several authors have shown that cooperative game theory models can predict negotiation 
outcomes in certain situations (Curry, Menasco, and Van Ark 1991; Eliashberg, LaTour, Rangaswamy, 
and Stern 1986; Menasco and Roy 1997). However, since these models leave the negotiation process 
unspecified, they are unable to fully explain why models fail. This “black box” approach to specifying the 
negotiation process of the earlier model provides motivation for including the negotiation process as part 
of the proposed model. 
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one party knows all the relevant information). I will briefly describe a prominent 
example of a game theory that is representative of each type of non-cooperative model 
in order to identify constructs that will be important in modeling the negotiation 
process.  
 
Figure 3  

















information. In this game, two parties seek to divide a fixed quantity M. Negotiation is 
Note: S is the feasible set, c is the conflict point, d is a status quo point, and I is 
the ideal point. N(S) is the Nash solution, K(S) is the Kalai-Smordinsky 
solution, GL(S) is the Gupta-Livne Solution, and H(S) is the Harsanyi solution.  
 
 
instein (1982) presents a non-cooperative game that assumes complete 
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cha giving racterized by the parties making alternating offers to receive a portion of M, 
the remaining portion to the other party. Each party is assumed to face some cost of 
delay that motivates them to settle early. This cost of delay is given by discount factors 
1δ  and 2δ for Party 1 and Party 2, respectively. Time is divided into periods, and in th
odd-numbered periods Party1 makes an offer to Party 2 of some division ),( xMx − . If 
rty 2 cepts, then the game ends with Party 1 receiving the payoff xt 1−δ and Party 2 
receiving the payoff )(1 xMt −−δ . If Party 2 rejects, and period t is not the end of the 
game, then Party 2 makes a counter-offer to Party 1 and the roles of the parties are 
reversed.  
Since any division of M is a Nash equilibrium, Rubinstein sought subgame-perf
equalibria or the set of credible Nash equilibr
e 
ect 





-credible strategies such as a threat by Party 1 to walk away if that party does not 
receive 70% of M. This threat is not credible because if Party 2 were to offer taking 
only 10% of M, it would not be in Party 1’s best interest to walk away with nothing 
(i.e., if Party 1 accepted, that party would get 90% of M, which is even better than th
threat). Rubinstein showed that this game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium 













.  )1( δδ −
Rubinstein’s solution has several important properties relevant to modeling the 




l, a single seller 
neg he seller 
enoted 
d by 
otiations as a sequence of alternating offers over the division of a fixed amount M
Second, the model identifies the important role that time discounting plays in how the 
parties value the settlement. Third, the solution has the appealing property that the more
impatient a party is (i.e., the party with the greater discount factor), the less payoff that 
party will receive. This intuitive result provides some face validity for the model, since 
one would expect this type of outcome in actual negotiations.  
The Tunisian Bazaar exemplifies non-cooperative models with incomplete 
information (Fudenberg, Levine, and Ruud 1986). In this mode
otiates with a single buyer for the price of a good. The value of the good to t
is noted by s, and is common knowledge. The value of the good to the buyer is d
by v, and it is only known through some probability distribution Pr(v) to the seller (the 
probability distribution is common knowledge). The negotiation process follows a 
similar offer structure as in Rubinstein’s model. However, the seller is the only party 
that makes offers. The buyer either rejects or accepts the offer. If the price is rejecte
the buyer, then the seller makes another offer. There is a discount factor δ that affects
the payoffs. The seller’s payoff is p
 
δ and the buyer’s payoff is )( pv −δ . Under suitable 
conditions, this game has a unique sequential equilibrium.12 However, as with non-
cooperative games, several empirical tests of negotiations that follow the rules of the 
Tunisian Bazaar show that actual behavior is not consistent with the sequential 
                                                 
12 The conditions for a unique sequential equilibrium include the support for the distribution of the 
buyer’s value strictly exceeds the seller’s value s, the seller cannot bargain with anyone else, and the 
seller’s prior beliefs about the buyer’s valuation are uniform on (0,1].  
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equilibrium predicted by theory (Rapoport, Erev, and Zwik 1995; Srivastava, 
Chakravarti and Rapoport 2000). 





2.3 Marketing Literature 




aar offers several clues on how to represent the negotiation process. First, many 
negotiations are characterized by parties that do not have complete information abou
each other’s utility functions, but possess some probability distribution for each other’s
reservation price. Second, negotiations need not entail explicit offers from both parties. 
In consumer negotiations, the retailer is often the only party making explicit offers and 
the consumer either accepts or rejects each offer. Finally, the seller acquires information
about the buyer’s reservation price through the sequence of offers. Each rejection by the 
buyer provides information about the likelihood of reservation prices.  
There are two main bodies of
 first body is comprised of the articles by Balakrishnan and Eliashberg (1995) and 
Chen, Yang and Zhao (2004), both of which offer structural models of the negotiation 
process. These models will provide a backdrop against which to explicate the 
contributions of the proposed model. The second body includes the rich stream
research in marketing on reference prices that will prove useful when specifying th
proposed model. Several alternative reference price definitions are identified in this 
literature stream. 
 35
2.3.1 Process Models 
Balakrishnan and Eliashberg (1995) draw on the economics and behavioral 
literatures to develop a model of the negotiation process based on the demand and 
concession model of Pruitt (1981) in which the parties’ behavior during negotiation 
represents a tradeoff between a “resistance force” and a “concession force.” The forces 
are specified as functions of each party’s current offer price, and Balakrishnan and 
Eliashberg’s model predicts the sequence of offers and counter-offers as a function of 
these opposing forces and each party’s aspiration level, reservation price, subjective 
relative bargaining power, and time pressure. An agreement is reached when the offers 
exceed a party’s concession point or the point at which the concession force vanishes. 
Balakrishnan and Eliashberg derive several propositions corresponding to the overall 
pattern of offers and a lower bound on negotiation duration. They test their model using 
a mail survey of industry experts and find that most experts agree with the predictions 
of the model. However, they provide no direct empirical evidence supporting their 
model. 
Chen, Yang, and Zhao (2004) present a model of choice behavior when prices are 
negotiable. They derive a utility-based model that draws on the applied game theory 
literature (Iyer and Villas-Boas 2003) and incorporate each party’s bargaining power, 
reservation price, and individual differences (e.g., race, gender, income, occupation). 
Chen, Yang, and Zhao define a party’s bargaining power as the difference between a 
party’s reservation price and the purchase price. A unique contribution of their approach 
is the ability to infer a party’s bargaining power and reservation price from data 
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containing only the final offer price and brand choice information regarding the 
purchase of a new automobile. They find that individual differences such as gender 
affect a party’s bargaining power and the negotiated price. However, they show that 
heterogeneity in the price coefficient is not significant. This implies that it is sufficient 
to model an overall effect for price on negotiation outcomes.  
2.3.2 Reference Prices 
The marketing literature has long recognized that consumers use some reference 
point in evaluating the price of a product (Monroe 1973). This literature contains 
several conceptualizations of reference price formation. For many researchers reference 
prices are based on a consumer’s memory of past prices of that brand or others in the 
same product category (Bucklin and Lattin 1989; Mayhew and Winer 1992). Others 
include contextual factors such as how often the brand is promoted, store 
characteristics, and price trends (Kalwani et al. 1990; Winer 1986). Another group of 
researchers argues that since consumers have poor memory of past prices (Dickson and 
Sawyer 1990), they are more likely to use current prices of certain brands (Hardie, 
Johnson and Fader 1993; Rajendran and Tellis 1994).  
Reference price is often operationalized as an ordinary least squares regression 
model of price on relevant independent variables (e.g., past prices, contextual factors, 
etc.). A common justification for this specification is provided by the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis (Muth 1961). Muth proposed that consumer price expectations 
are essentially the same as those predicted by economic theory. In particular, consumers 
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learn over time the decision rules that retailers use to set price and form expectations 
about these pricing rules. Consumer expectations are drawn from a price distribution 
with mean zero, which implies that the price expectation is an unbiased estimate of the 
actual price. Consequently, consumer price expectations can be operationalized as a 
simple regression whose error distribution is serially uncorrelated across time and has 
mean zero (i.e., using an ordinary least squares equation). 
Several empirical tests confirm the effect of reference price by including terms 
in the consumer’s utility specification to represent perceived price gains and price losses 
(Kalwani et al. 1990; Mayhew and Winer 1992; Winer 1986). A perceived gain occurs 
when the list price is less than a consumer’s reference price, whereas a perceived loss 
occurs when the list price is above the consumer’s reference price. The empirical results 
are consistent with the loss aversion implication of Prospect Theory. In particular, 
results show that perceived losses have a greater impact on a consumer’s choice than 
perceived gains. Briesch, Krishnamurthi, Mazumdar, and Raj (1997) tested a variety of 
reference price models to determine the best fit, prediction, and parsimony. They found 
that the best model of consumer’s reference price was one that used the past history of a 
brand’s prices. Furthermore, for many products, using only the most recent past price 
was sufficient to capture the effect of a consumer’s reference price on brand choice. 
Although the marketing literature on reference prices is limited to exogenous 
prices, a similar process may occur for negotiated prices. Buyers might form 
expectations about the final settlement price given their memory of past prices and the 
seller’s current offer price. Several reference price specifications from the marketing 
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literature are particularly relevant to the study of negotiation. For example, several 
researchers have found that consumers often use past prices of a brand as a reference 
price during future purchase occasions (e.g., Briesch et al. 1997; Bucklin and Lattin 
1989; Hardie, Johnson, and Fader 1993; Kalwani, Yim, Rinne, and Sugita 1990; 
Kalyanaram and Winer 1995; Mayhew and Winer 1992). This suggests that negotiators 
may use the most recent own-brand offer as their reference price. Jacobson and 
Obermiller (1990) explore several reference prices based on the rational expectations 
theory of Muth (1961). Reference price is modeled as a regression of current price onto 
past purchase prices. This suggests that negotiators may use a weighted-average of past 
offers as a reference price. Similar definitions of competitor-brand reference prices have 
been used in the literature. The initial and most recent competitor-brand prices have 
been used in several articles (e.g., Briesch et al. 1997). Jacobson and Obermiller (1990) 
also consider a rational expectations model using competitor-brand prices, which 
suggests using a similar definition here. Several definitions of reference price from the 
marketing literatures are summarized in Table 1. 
2.4 Literature Summary 
Although economic models provide important insights into negotiation, several 
researchers have failed to find empirical support for game theory models of negotiation. 
For example, Ochs and Roth (1989) show Rubinstein’s sub-game perfect equilibrium is 
not consistent with actual behavior. They found disagreements occurred more often than 
predicted, counter-offers were less advantageous than initial offers, and observed 
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outcomes were more consistent with an equitable division of the available payoff 
compared to the normative predictions. Srivastava, Chakravarti, and Rapoport (2000) 
show that actual negotiations often last longer than the duration predicted by the 
noncooperative game theory of Fudenberg, Levine, and Ruud (1985). Also, Rapoport, 
Erev, and Zwik (1995) show that there is little empirical support for non-cooperative 
games with incomplete information. Collectively this research suggests that game 
theory models may prove too restrictive to explain actual negotiation behavior.  
 
Table 1  
REFERENCE PRICES IN MARKETING AND BEHAVIORAL LITERATURESa 
 
 
Reference Price Definition 
Initial price (Northcraft and Neale 1987) )0( =tPrice  
Most recent price (Mayhew and Winer 1992) )( 1tPrice −  
Regression of past prices (Jacobson and 
Obermiller 1990) ∑ < )(ˆ ttPrice jjβ  
Average past prices (White and Neale 1996) )( ttAve.Price j <  
Initial competitor price (Briesch et al. 1997) )0(CompPrice  
Most recent competitor price (Briesch et al. 
1997) 
)( 1tCompPrice −  
Regression of past competitor prices (Jacobson 
and Obermiller 1990) ∑ < )(ˆ ttCompPrice jjγ  
Average past competitor prices (Blount et al. 
1994) 
)( tticeAve.CompPr j <  
 
a Price is the own-brand price; CompPrice is the competitor-brand price; are 




Although the models introduced by Balakrishnan and Eliashberg (1995) and Chen, 
Yang, and Zhao (2004) overcome some of the limitations of prior research, they each 
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suffer from limitations. For example, the Balakrishnan and Eliashberg (1995) model 
requires that at least two offers are observed from the buyer in order to estimate model 
parameters. This obviously limits the applicability of the model. The model of Chen, 
Yang, and Zhao (2004) is limited to negotiations that eventually end in a purchase. 
However, many negotiations result in the parties failing to reach agreement. Finally, 
both models assume that the structural parameters (e.g., reservation price and 
bargaining power) are fixed over time. However, these parameters are likely to vary 
over time in response to changing situational variables, such as rising negotiation costs 
due to an impending deadline. 
2.4.1 Research Contributions 
There are five main contributions of the proposed model. First, the proposed 
model captures how a buyer’s reservation value changes over time. Prior negotiation 
models assume buyers maintain a fixed reservation value throughout negotiation. The 
proposed model predicts a buyer’s reservation value as a function of time, negotiation 
costs, a discount rate, and the seller’s offer rate. The model quantifies the intuition that 
when buyers face a purchase deadline, the instantaneous probability of purchase (i.e., 
the purchase hazard rate) should decrease over time and as negotiation costs increase, 
but increase with the seller’s offer rate and average relative offer. Second, the proposed 
model easily leads to an empirically estimable model. Prior negotiation models (e.g., 
those based on game theory) are often not estimable, making it difficult to test their 
implications using actual negotiation data. Consequently, it is relatively easy to 
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empirically validate the proposed model. Third, the proposed model is empirically 
validated using a sample of actual negotiations over the rental of a durable product. 
Prior empirical negotiation research relies almost exclusively on simulated negotiations 
within a laboratory setting. Consequently, the present results provide managerially 
relevant insights into real negotiation processes between a buyer and seller. Fourth, the 
model does not assume that a buyer always reaches agreement with a seller. 
Consequently, the proposed model can differentiate between how the relevant 
parameters affect the choice to purchase versus the choice to exit the negotiation. Fifth, 
the proposed model clarifies the effect of a buyer’s reference price on the negotiation 
outcome. The prior negotiation literature offers conflicting findings on which reference 
price is most important. In the proposed model, the effect of alternative reference prices 
can be precisely estimated. In summary, the proposed model overcomes the limitations 
of prior models of negotiation while providing both theoretically and managerially 









3    Search Theory 
 
The choices characterizing asymmetric negotiations are very similar to the 
choices that an unemployed individual makes when searching for a new job (Merlo 
1997). Remarkably, many of the constructs and relationships in job-search models are 
analogous to those characterizing asymmetric negotiations. The economic theory of job-
search describes the dynamics of labor force participation in terms of a job-seeker’s 
decision making under uncertainty (Flinn and Heckman 1982). The process of job 
search is characterized by a series of choices to either accept or reject wage offers made 
by prospective employers. Job-seekers are assumed to maximize utility by seeking the 
highest paying jobs (largest wage offers). In the simplest models, the possible choices 
are to either accept a current wage offer or to continue searching. The choice is made by 
comparing the value of a current wage offer with the expected present value of 
searching over some short period in the future. Job-seekers are assumed to posses a 
reservation wage, such that wage offers above the reservation wage are accepted, and 
wage offers below the reservation wage are rejected and job search continues. The 
entire process is represented by the job-seeker existing in either a state of search or a 
state of employment. Job-search models predict the transitions between these states, 
given the optimality constraints imposed by the properties of the reservation wage, 
utility maximization and the choices characterizing job search. Additionally, these 
models identify and measure the effect of factors impacting the transition probabilities.  
The analogy between job-search and asymmetric negotiation is straight-forward. 
Buyer-negotiators are like job-seekers searching for a new job. Buyers maximize utility 
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by seeking the lowest offer price. Buyers either accept a current offer price or continue 
negotiating. The choice is made by comparing the utility of the current offer with the 
expected present value of negotiation over a short period in the future. Buyers are 
assumed to posses a reservation price, such that offer prices below the reservation price 
are accepted and offers above the reservation price are rejected and negotiation 
continues. The entire process is represented by a series of state-spaces in which the 
consumer occupies only a single state at any particular time. A model of this process 
can be used to explain and predict the transitions between states given a set optimality 
constraints.  
3.1 A Static Negotiation Model 
  In this section, I describe a static job search model in terms of its analogous 
constructs in an asymmetric negotiation over the purchase of a product. The structural 
model is similar to the two-state, structural job-search model of Lancaster (1990) in that 
the negotiation process consists of two states: negotiation (n) and purchase (p). Buyers 
start out negotiating and eventually transition to the purchase state, where they 
permanently reside. The negotiation transpires over a finite time horizon. There is no 
learning and all parameters and distributions are known to the buyer. The buyer’s 
instantaneous utilities at time t in the purchase and negotiation states 
are and , respectively. The relative offer r(t) is a realization of the 
random variable
)()( trtu p = ctun −=)(
)()()( tPttR −= ρ , where )(tρ is the buyer’s reference price and P(t) is 
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the seller’s offer price at time t, respectively.13 Relative offers are assumed to be 
positive valued. In the subsequent discussion, the terms “relative offers” and “offers” 
are used synonymously. The density function for R(t) is denoted by f and the 
distribution function is F. The offer distribution f is assumed to be independent of time. 
The offers arrive in a Poisson process at the rate λ per unit of time. The value -c is the 
negotiation cost, which is fixed over time. Future utility is discounted at the constant 
rateδ .  
 The buyer is assumed to be forward looking but myopic in assessing future 
outcomes. This means that at each time t, the buyer’s choice of what state to occupy is 
based on the buyer’s consideration of the net present utility of being in each state over a 
short horizon h. The buyer chooses the state with the highest expected net present utility 
over h. The buyer incurs a negotiation cost, discounted for the time that transpires over 
the short horizon. The horizon is chosen small enough to ensure that if an offer arrives, 
one and only one offer arrives within the horizon. If a new offer arrives, the buyer 
evaluates the expected net present utility of the new offer with respect to the reservation 
value. This expectation will depend on the relative offer distribution along with the 
discounted value of purchasing at the relative offer value. If no new offer arrives, the 
buyer will continue to receive the net present utility of negotiation. The total net present 
utility of negotiation is the sum of the discounted negotiation costs, the discounted 
utility of purchase given that a new offer arrives, and the discounted utility of continued 
negotiation given that no new offer arrives.  
                                                 
13 In the subsequent analysis, several reference price specifications are considered. Some of these 
specifications allow the reference price to change over time. 
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The buyer’s tradeoffs during negotiation can be formalized in the following 
way. The present utility of purchase at t is the instantaneous utility of purchase 
discounted over an infinite time horizon, or ( )
δ
)(),( trctrVp =− .
14 The present value of 
negotiation over h is the discounted cost of negotiation plus the expected present utility 
of continued negotiation. The negotiation cost is given by ch− . Since offers arrive in a 
Poisson process with rateλ , the probability of receiving a new offer within the short 
horizon h is hλ , and the probability of not receiving a new offer during the short horizon 
is )1( hλ− . If no new offer arrives, the buyer continues to obtain the present utility of 
negotiation . However, if a new offer r(t) arrives, the buyer receives either the present 
utility of purchase, , or the present value of negotiation, whichever is larger. 
Therefore, the expected present utility of negotiation at time t is: 
nV
( ctrVp −),( )
 






















In equation (3), is the discount factor over the short period (t, t+h). The 












                                                 
14 This assumes risk-neutral utility and that the buyer will enjoy the product from t to . Hence, the 




The term nVδξ =  is the offer that equates ( ))(trVp to . Hence, nV ξ is the reservation 
offer that determines when the consumer purchases. Once the reservation offer is 
calculated, the optimal decision rule is to purchase when the offer is greater thanξ . The 
value of ξ is found by substituting (4) into (3), multiplying by , taking the 
limit as , and substituting
)1(1 hh δ+−
∞→h nVδξ =  . This yields the following implicit function 
forξ  : 
 






λξ dFrc )( . 
 
Equation (5) has a unique solution and acts as a constraint on the consumer’s optimal 
decision path.15 Equation (5) is the structural model for the buyer’s static reservation 
value. This describes the reservation value ξ  as a function of the discount rate δ , the 
negotiation cost c, the offer rate λ , and the expected relative offer value. Note that it is 
possible for , in which case the optimal decision would be to stop negotiating and 
to not purchase. This possibility requires a second exit state of no-purchase.  
0<nV
 Several probability distributions can be deduced from the above analysis. Some 
of these are shown below and will be referred to in the subsequent analysis. In these 
expressions, the following variables are used: t denotes the negotiation duration; a 
                                                 
15 See the Appendix for details on this and other derivations. 
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denotes the accepted offer; n denotes the number of rejected offers; and  denotes 
the rejected offers. These distributions assume that data exist for each variable in the 
distribution (e.g., no variable is censored or unobserved) 
nrr ,...,1
The probability distribution of the negotiation duration, denoted by , is 
given by equation (6). This is found by first considering the hazard function or the 
probability that a buyer purchases in the short interval (t,t+h). This equals the 
probability the buyer receives an offer,
)(tg
hλ , times the probability that the offer exceeds 
the reservation offer, )(1)( ξξ FF −= . Therefore, the hazard function associated with 
entering the purchase state is )()( ξλθ Ft = . The hazard is independent of time since the 
parameters are stationary by assumption. Note that the hazard for ending negotiation is 
expressed in terms of the offer distribution. This relationship characterizes all structural 
search models and is an important feature that a formal hazard specification would have 
to satisfy in order to reflect optimal decision making.  
The duration probability distribution (6) is found by applying properties of 
hazard functions. Equation (7) is the probability distribution of accepted offers. Since 
the probability of acceptance is independent of time, the joint distribution (8) of 
duration and accepted offers is the product of (6) and (7). Finally, (9) is the joint 
distribution of the negotiation duration (t); the accepted offer (a); the number of rejected 
offers (k), and the rejected offers ( ). A derivation of (9) is given in the Appendix. nrr ,...,1
 
(6)    tFeFtg )()()( ξλξλ −= , for  0≥t
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afag =  ξ>afor  
(8)    ,)(),( )( tFeaftag ξλλ −= 0;afor ≥> tξ  













afetkarg λλ  
0 t;a 1,2,...;k ;,...,rfor 1 ≥≥=< ξξkr  
 
Note that in (9), the joint density is expressed only in terms of the parameters of the 
observed variables. In particular, the reservation price ξ appears only in the constraint. 
This fact will play an important role in model estimation. However, before I discuss 
how to estimate this model, I turn next to several extensions of the basic model that are 
needed in order to capture key aspects of the negotiation process.  
3.2 Static Model Extensions 
 The static model makes several restrictive assumptions. In particular, the 
parameters do not depend upon time. This implies that: (a) the probability of purchase is 
independent of time and (b) the negotiation duration does not depend on the exit state.16 
Hence, the static model only reflects the situation when the purchase probability 
depends on a negotiation having taken place (i.e., irrespective of its duration). The static 
model does not capture the effect of time-varying parameters, e.g.,  In the 
paragraphs below, I present several extensions to the static model that address the 
cttun −=)( .
                                                 
16 Implication (b) results from properties of mixed duration models (e.g., competing risks) when the state-
specific “hazards” are constant over time (Lancaster 1990).  
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assumption of time-invariant parameters and other limitations. Some of these extensions 
will be employed in my proposed model.  
3.2.1 Multiple States and Transitions 
 Although the description of the static model only has two-states, it can 
accommodate additional exit states. However, these states must be defined with respect 
to the same utility function (e.g., “no purchase” when 0<nV ). Sometimes the 
transitions to separate exit states depend on decision rules derived from different utility 
functions. For example, if a consumer simultaneously negotiates with several sellers 
over the same product, then the choice to not purchase from one seller depends on the 
expected present value of utility obtained from another seller. In this case, several 
reservation offer values are needed to specify the model (e.g., Kξξ ,...,1 ), with each one 
corresponding to a different utility function associated with purchasing from another 
seller. For example, in the case of two sellers, the utility for negotiation (n), purchase 
(b), and no purchase (b’) would be: ctun −=)( , )()( tdtub = , and . In this 
case, the expected present utility for negotiation includes additional terms 
corresponding to the optimal choice between negotiation and no purchase. Also, there is 
an additional implicit function similar to equation (5) specifying the constraint on the 
second reservation offer (cf., Flinn and Heckmann 1982). Unfortunately, the additional 
)()(' tetub =
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negotiations are often not observed, limiting applications of this approach to reduced 
form specifications of additional utility functions.17
3.2.2 Time-varying Parameters 
 The most severe limitation of the static model is the assumption that the offer 
distribution f, the offer rateλ , the discount rateδ , and the costs c are independent of 
time. However, some of these parameters are likely to change over time in an actual 
negotiation. For example, a buyer’s knowledge of the offer distribution may increase 
over time as the buyer acquires more information through the sequence of offers made 
by the seller. In this case, f would depend on time. Also, it is reasonable to assume costs 
increase over time. In fact, increasing costs are a primary motivation to achieve an early 
settlement (Cross 1965). Unfortunately, allowing these parameters to vary over time 
substantially complicates the basic model. For example, if costs depend on time, then 
the optimal reservation offer will also depend on time (i.e., )(tξξ = ). I will return to 
this issue in the description of the proposed model. 
                                                 
17 Van Den Berg (1990) notes that one rarely observes returns to non-participation (i.e., the equivalent of 
the no-purchase state) and therefore assumes the transition to the out-of-market state is a Poisson process 
with transition rateς .  
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4    Proposed Model 
The behavioral and economics literatures provide complementary theories of 
negotiation behavior. The proposed model of negotiation behavior is based on 
assumptions drawn from both literatures. Several properties are adopted from the two 
literatures as “structural” features of the proposed model. Although formally these 
properties are treated as model assumptions, they are justified by empirical and 
theoretical results in the two literatures. However, since the best specification of 
reference price is likely to depend on the particular application, the issue of how to 
specify the reference price is left as an empirical question to be explored by the 
reduced-form model.  
4.1 Model Assumptions 
 Buyer preferences in the proposed model are represented by a von-Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944) utility function and observed choices result from maximizing a 
buyer’s indirect utility function (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995). Following 
Koopmans (1960), Cross (1965), and others, the present utility of consumption over 
time is assumed to be a discounted function of the utility in each time period. In 
particular, there exists a discount rate δ such that the present utility (V) of future 
consumption equals the discounted utility at the time of consumption. For example, if 
represents consumption at some future time T, then the present utility of is Tx Tx
)()( TtT xuxV δ= . Sequences of consumption over time are similarly discounted. 
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Therefore, the present utility of the consumption sequence ),...,,( 10 Txxxx =  is given by 
. If consumption lasts indefinitely, the present utility is the infinite 
sum of discounted utilities over time. The proposed model assumes that buyers 










 Several researchers have shown that when evaluating a sequence of future 
events, more attention is given to outcomes occurring in the near future (e.g., Prelec and 
Lowenstein 1991), so that utility maximization effectively occurs only over a short time 
horizon (Strotz 1955). This suggests that buyers myopically maximize utility during 
negotiation by only considering outcomes occurring over a short time horizon. Also, 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) implies that buyers value offers with 
respect to a reference point, typically a reference price. In the context of brand choice, 
the marketing and behavioral negotiation literatures have identified several types of 
reference prices (Kalyanaram and Winer 1995; Northcraft and Neale 1987; White and 
Neale 1994). Since the negotiation literature provides equivocal support as to which 
reference price dominates during negotiation, the precise specification of the reservation 
price is undefined in the structural model. Instead, buyers are assumed to consider 
relative offers, defined as the difference between the current offer price and the 
reference price . Finally, the model assumes there is a minimum threshold or 





                                                
below ξ are rejected (Raiffa 1982). Buyers are indifferent between accepting and 
rejecting the reservation value. The reservation value ξ will be allowed to vary with 
time. 
 The model incorporates the same abstract representation of an asymmetric 
negotiation process as commonly found in the game theory literature (cf. Fudenberg, 
Levine, and Ruud 1985). The representation is augmented by modifications regarding 
how buyers value an offer and myopically consider future prospective utility streams. 
Only the seller makes explicit offers and the buyer either accepts or rejects the seller’s 
offers. If an offer is rejected, the buyer can either continue negotiating or exit 
negotiation. If negotiation continues, the seller makes a new offer.18 Once an offer is 
rejected, it is assumed that the buyer cannot go back to the previous offer at a later date. 
If an offer is accepted, the buyer purchases at the most recent offer price. Hence, the 
negotiation process is characterized by a sequence of offers by the seller and decision 
by the buyer to accept or reject each of the seller’s offers. 
4.2 Conceptual Model  
As previously mentioned, The choices characterizing asymmetric price 
negotiations are very similar to the choices made when searching for a new job (Merlo 
1997; Flinn and Heckman 1982) or a new automobile (Ratchford and Srinivasan 1993). 
Buyers maximize utility by seeking the highest relative offer less the negotiation costs. 
 
18 Note that since negotiations may proceed over a long duration, the seller’s offers may fluctuate due to 
changing market conditions that may affect its costs (e.g., inventory fluctuations). 
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The seller makes offers to buyers, who accept, continue negotiating, or exit negotiation. 
A choice is determined by comparing the utility of the current relative offer with the 
expected present value of negotiation over a short period in the future. The events in the 
negotiation process are represented by a set of state-spaces. The buyer occupies a single 
state at a particular time. Transitions between states correspond to choices during 
negotiation. An illustration of this conceptual model of the negotiation process in terms 
of state-space transitions is depicted in Figure 5.  
The state transitions in Figure 5 correspond to choices during the negotiation 
process. The buyer starts in the market entry state. If the buyer chooses to negotiate, the 
buyer transitions along the path (A) to the negotiation state.19 After transitioning to the 
negotiation state, the buyer has several options. The buyer can continue negotiating 
along path (B), purchase along path (C), or exit negotiation along path (D). If a buyer 
enters the purchase or exit negotiation states, the buyer permanently resides there. The 
transition from negotiation state to negotiation state represents a choice to continue 
negotiating, and the entire process may entail multiple loops within the negotiation 
state. 
Note that the model can be generalized to accommodate multiple purchases or 
simultaneous negotiations with more than one seller with the addition of more state-
spaces (not pictured here). Also, since the negotiation occurs over time, the probability 
of transitioning to the purchase state is not necessarily the complement of the 
 
19 In the subsequent structural model, buyers are assumed to start in the negotiation state. 
probability of transitioning to the exit negotiation state. This situation contrasts with a 
static choice model, where choices do not depend on time, and the probability of 
purchasing equals one minus the probability of not purchasing.  
 
Figure 4 
















4.3 Structural Model 
  This section describes the proposed structural model for asymmetric price 
negotiations. Several properties of this model are derived when relative offers are 
assumed to be exponentially distributed and negotiation cost increases over time. The 
instantaneous probability of transitioning to the purchase state is shown to be a 
proportional hazard function. This proportional hazard will facilitate estimation and 
interpretation of an empirical model that is used to test several properties of the model. 
First, a description of the two-state model is given in which buyers exist in either a 
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negotiation or a purchase state. Later this model is generalized to include an exit 
negotiation state.  
4.3.1 Structural Model of Time-varying Reservation Value 
 The proposed structural model is similar to the two-state, static structural job-
search model of Lancaster (1990) described in Section 3.1. The negotiation process 
consists of two states: negotiation (n) and purchase (p). Buyers start out negotiating and 
eventually transition to the purchase state, where they permanently reside. The 
negotiation transpires over a finite time horizon. There is no learning and all parameters 
and distributions are known to the buyer. The buyer’s instantaneous utilities at time t in 
the purchase and negotiation states are )()( trtu p = and )()( tctun −= , respectively. The 
relative offer r(t) is a realization of the random variable )()()( tPttR −= ρ , where )(tρ is 
the buyer’s reference price and P(t) is the seller’s offer price at time t, respectively.20 
Relative offers are assumed to be positive valued. In the subsequent discussion, the 
terms “relative offers” and “offers” are used synonymously. The density function for 
R(t) is denoted by f and the distribution function is F. The offer distribution f is assumed 
to be independent of time. The offers arrive in a Poisson process at the rate λ per unit of 
time. The function c(t) is the negotiation cost, which increases over time. Future utility 
is discounted at the constant rateδ .  
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20 In the subsequent analysis, several reference price specifications are considered. Some of these 
specifications allow the reference price to change over time. 
 The structure of this model is the same as the static model presented in Section 
3.1. The buyer is assumed to be forward looking but myopic in assessing future 
outcomes. The buyer chooses the state with the highest expected net present utility over 
h. The buyer incurs a negotiation cost, discounted for the time that transpires over the 
short horizon. The horizon is chosen small enough to ensure that if an offer arrives, one 
and only one offer arrives within the horizon. If a new offer arrives, the buyer evaluates 
the expected net present utility of the new offer with respect to the reservation value. If 
no new offer arrives, the buyer will continue to receive the net present utility of 
negotiation. The total net present utility of negotiation is the sum of the discounted 
negotiation costs, the discounted utility of purchase given that a new offer arrives, and 
the discounted utility of continued negotiation given that no new offer arrives.  
The buyer’s tradeoffs during negotiation can be formalized in the following 
way. The present utility of purchase at t is the instantaneous utility of purchase 
discounted over an infinite time horizon, or ( )
δ
)()(),( trtctrVp =− .
21 The present value of 
negotiation over h is the discounted cost of negotiation plus the expected present utility 
of continued negotiation. The negotiation cost is given by )( htc +− . Since offers arrive 
in a Poisson process with rateλ , the probability of receiving a new offer within the 
short horizon h is hλ , and the probability of not receiving a new offer during the short 
horizon is )1( hλ− . If no new offer arrives, the buyer continues to obtain the present 
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21 This assumes risk-neutral utility and that the buyer will enjoy the product from t to . Hence, the 
present value of consumption is the discounted instantaneous utility over an infinite time horizon.  
∞
utility of negotiation . However, if a new offer r(t) arrives, the buyer receives either 
the present utility of purchase, 
nV
( ))(),( tctrVp − , or the present value of negotiation, 















In equation (13), is the discount factor over the period (t, t+h). The 
expectation  is taken with respect to the offer distribution f. Multiplying equation 













Taking the limit  gives: 0→h
 
(15) ( )( ))(),(max()()()()( trVtVEtVtctVtV
dt
d
pnRnnn λλδ +−−=+− . 
 
The expectation can be written (after taking the limit as ) as: 0→h
















The term )()( tVt nδξ =  is the reservation value that equates the net present utility of 
purchase, , to the net present utility of continued negotiation, . Recall that 
F is the cumulative distribution function for the relative offers. The reservation 
value
( )(trVp ) )(tVn
)(tξ provides a rule for determining if the buyer purchases at each time t. The 
decision rule is to purchase when the relative offer r(t) is greater than )(tξ . Substituting 
)()( tVt nδξ =  into (16), and adding and subtracting terms yields: 
 






























Substituting (17) into (15) yields the following implicit function for )(tξ : 
 












Thus, equation (18) is the proposed structural model for the buyer’s time-varying 
reservation value. Note that equation (18) is a nonlinear differential equation of )(tξ  
with respect to time. This equation describes how the reservation value )(tξ changes 
over time as a function of the discount rateδ , the negotiation cost c(t), the offer rateλ , 
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and the expected relative offer value. Equation (18) acts as a constraint on the buyer’s 
transition path between the state of negotiation and the purchase state. This equation is 
used to derive several interesting properties that govern asymmetric price negotiations.  
Equation (18) has a unique solution as long as the negotiation cost is finite. This 
condition is guaranteed when the buyer faces a purchase deadline. If the purchase 
deadline occurs at some point in time T, then the negotiation cost is fixed after T 
or  for . However, since the negotiation cost is assumed to be fixed after 
the deadline, this implies that the reservation value will be fixed for or
Tctc =)( Tt ≥
Tt ≥ Tt ξξ =)( . 
A similar derivation to the one above shows that for , the fixed reservation 
value
Tt >
Tξ  is implicitly defined by the following equation:
22
 








λξ )( . 
 
Equation (19) provides a terminal condition that can be used to solve differential 
equation (18) for the time-varying reservation value )(tξ  when Tt ≤ . Equation (19) is 
also useful to formally prove the properties of the structural model.  
4.3.2 Structural Model Implications 
  There are several interesting implications of the proposed structural model of 
asymmetric price negotiation. First, in order to ensure that a buyer’s decision rule for 
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22 See Section 3.1. 
purchasing will be met within the time left, the buyer must lower his/her reservation 
value )(tξ over time. Hence, the reservation value will decrease over time. Second, since 
the negotiation cost is increasing, equation (13) implies that the buyer faces a 
decreasing expected net present utility from continued negotiation. Consequently, the 
buyer’s reservation value )(tξ will decrease as negotiation costs increase. If the relative 
offers are exponentially distributed, then the instantaneous probability of purchase or 
purchase hazard rate is given by the expression ( ))(exp)( tt λξλθ −= . Hence, the hazard 
rate )(tθ increases if and only if the reservation value )(tξ decreases. Consequently, the 
hazard rate will increase with increases in both time and negotiation cost. These 
properties are summarized in the following proposition, whose formal proof is given in 
the Appendix: 
 
Proposition 1: The purchase hazard rate )(tθ increases as time and 
negotiation cost increase.  
 
 Although the relative offer distribution and offer rate are assumed fixed over 
time, how the buyer might react to changes in these parameters is interesting because 
the offer distribution and offer rate are decision variables for the seller. Consider the 
effect of an increase in the average relative offer on the buyer’s reservation value, which 
is defined as the value that equates the discounted net present utility of purchase to the 
discounted net present utility of continued negotiation. Since an increase in the average 
relative offer will increase the expected net present utility of purchase, this will increase 
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the buyer’s reservation value in kind. Consequently, increasing the average relative 
offer will increase the buyer’s reservation value. Second, consider the effect of an 
increase in the seller’s offer rate. If the buyer faces a high offer rate, then the buyer 
knows that new offers will arrive shortly. Consequently, the buyer can afford to set a 
high reservation value, since the buyer can assume that a viable offer (i.e., one that 
exceeds the buyer’s reservation value) will arrive within a short period of time. 
Therefore, the purchase hazard rate will decrease with an increase in the average 
relative offer and an increase in the offer rate. These properties are summarized in the 
following proposition, whose proof is given in the Appendix. 
  
Proposition 2: The purchase hazard rate )(tθ decreases as the offer rate and the 








5    Empirical Model and Validation 
In general, it is difficult to solve equation (18) to derive a closed-form 
expression for the reservation value )(tξ . This difficulty arises since the integral in 
equation (18) does not have a closed form solution for many distributions. Nonetheless, 
the time-dependent reservation value )(tξ can be used to derive the probability 
distribution of the negotiation duration. Consider the probability that a buyer negotiates 
up to time t, and then purchases within a short interval (t,t+h). This probability equals 
the probability that the buyer receives an offer ( hλ ) times the probability that the offer 
exceeds the reservation value or ))((1 tF ξ− . If the limit is taken of the ratio of this 
probability to the length of the time interval as the short time interval shrinks to zero, 
the purchase hazard rate results. Using the notation ( ) ( ))(1)( tFtS ξξ −= , the hazard rate 
is ( )()( tSt )ξλθ = . Properties of the hazard rate imply that the duration probability is 
given by in equation (20).  )(tg
 












Thus, equation (20) is the proposed structural model expressed in terms of negotiation 
duration. Note that equation (20) is complicated by the potentially non-trivial integral 
inside the exponential function. This model can be estimated by first solving for the 
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optimality constraint represented by equation (18), inserting this estimate into equation 
(20), and then estimating the structural parameters (e.g., by using maximum likelihood 
procedures). In applications, the structural parameters may depend on individual 
differences or product characteristics. 
5.1 Empirical Model Parameter Estimation 
Although all of the parameters can be estimated using a likelihood function 
derived from the structural model (i.e., using equations (18) and (20)), it is often the 
case that some of the structural parameters (e.g., the discount rateδ ) are not observed. 
Inclusion of an additional transition state (exit negotiation) introduces additional 
unidentifiable parameters (e.g., the offer rate for exiting the market). However, a 
reduced-form specification can be found that is consistent with the structural model. If 
the relative offers are distributed according to an exponential distribution and the 
negotiation cost is linear, then differential equation (18) can be solved and used in 
equation (20) to a derive closed-form expression for the hazard rate )(tθ . In the 
Appendix, the closed-form expression is shown to be equivalent to a proportional 
hazard model in which )()(),( 21 txxt κκθ = , where )(1 xκ  is a buyer-specific term and 
)(2 tκ is common to all the buyers considered (Lancaster 1990). The proportional hazard 
model parameters are easy to interpret, which facilitates testing Propositions 1 and 2 
and exploring alternative specifications of the reference price. 
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 The model described above is for two-state transitions between the negotiation 
state and the purchase state. However, buyers also face the option of not making a 
purchase. This is incorporated into the proposed model by adding a second outcome 
state, exit negotiation, which has an associated utility and reservation valueEV )(tEξ . 
Although the “offers” corresponding to the exit negotiation state are not identified, if 
entrants into the exit negotiation state are observed and if the utility of no purchase is 
conceptualized as the disutility of purchase, then it is reasonable to assume that 
transitions to exiting negotiation are modeled using the same functional form as for 
transitions to purchase. This assumption is made in estimating the model below.  
5.2 Competing-risks Specification 
The empirical specification is motivated by the properties of the structural 
model (i.e., a proportional hazard model). Since the goal is to accommodate multiple 
terminal states (purchase and exit negotiation), a competing-risks hazard model is 
considered. This model differs from a standard hazard model in that the transition to 
each terminal state j is governed by a separate instantaneous probability 
function ),( xtjθ , known as the transition rate. The function ),( xtjθ is the probability of 
exiting in the short interval (t,t+h) to the j-th state. The overall hazard function ),( xtθ is 
the probability of exiting in the short interval (t,t+h), regardless of the terminal state, 









parameters in a competing-risks model requires information on which terminal state the 
buyer transitions into after negotiation.  
The following specification is used to estimate the effects of time (t), negotiation 
cost (cost), offer rate (rate), and relative offer value (value) on the transition rates to the 
purchase and exit negotiation states: 
 
(21) ( ) ( ) ( )valueratecost(t)t),X(tt jjjijjiiij 43210 expexp βββββθ +++= . 
 
In equation (21), the subscript i denotes the buyer and the subscript j denotes the 
terminal state. A value for j equal to 1 corresponds to purchasing and a value equal to 2 
corresponds to exiting negotiation. The symbol denotes the value of the covariates 
(cost(t), rate, and value) for the i-th buyer. Equation (21) is a proportional hazard model 
since it is expressed as the product of a buyer-specific function and a function of time 
that is common to all the buyers in the dataset.
iX
23 Note that this property is consistent 
with the structural model presented above. The buyer-specific covariates include 
negotiation costs, the offer rate, and the relative offer value. The relative offer value is 
the difference between the offer price and a reference price. The variable cost(t) is a 
time-varying covariate whose complete time path is known a priori to the customer.24 
                                                 
23 Technically, equation (21) is not a hazard function because it depends on the terminal state. 
Nonetheless, expressions like equation (21) are almost always called hazard functions within a 
competing-risks framework (Lancaster 1990), and this terminology is used here to emphasize that the 
functional form in equation (21) is the same proportional function as in the structural model.  
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24 This assumption is required to justify using the proposed likelihood expression given below (Lancaster 
1990, pp. 24-25). 
The discount rate is not included since there is no suitable available proxy. The 
competing-risks model for two terminal states is estimated using maximum likelihood, 
where the log-likelihood function is given by equation (22): 
 





















The variable appearing in the log-likelihood function in equation (22) is a dummy 
variable indicating whether person i transitioned to state j. 
ijd
5.3 Reference Price Alternatives  
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A final consideration is the operationalization of the relative offer. In the 
development of the structural model, a relative offer is the difference between the 
current offer price and a reference price. The specification of reference price was left 
undefined. The competing-risks hazard model is estimated using several reference price 
specifications, and it is left as an empirical question as to which specification yields the 
best fit to the data. The specifications employed are drawn from the behavioral 
negotiation and marketing literatures. For example, Northcraft and Neale (1987) find 
that buyers often employ the initial list price as their reference price when negotiating 
the purchase price of a house. This suggests specifying the reference price as the list 
price. Several researchers have found that consumers often use past prices of a brand as 
a reference price during future purchase occasions (e.g., Briesch, Krishnamurthi, 
Mazumdar, and Raj 1997; Mayhew and Winer 1992). This suggests specifying the 
reference price as the most recent offer price. Finally, White and Neale (1996) show 
that the average selling price is used as the reference price when determining the final 
negotiated price. This suggests specifying the reference price as the average of previous 
offer prices. 
In summary, three specifications of reference price are used to model the effect 
of relative offers on negotiation duration. These specifications are given in Table 2. All 
relative offers are defined as the difference between a reference price and the offer price 
at the point of transition (i.e., to either the purchase or exit negotiation state).  
 
Table 2  
REFERENCE PRICES USED IN ESTIMATION 
 
Label Reference Price Specificationa
InitialPrice Initial price (Northcraft and Neale 1987) )(0Price  
RecentPrice Most recent price (Mayhew and Winer 1992) )( 1tPrice −  
AveragePrice Average past price (White and Neale 1996) )( 1,...,0 −tAve.Price  
 
 
a The value appearing in parentheses in the specification of each reference price is the 
period during which the price is evaluated, and t is the period corresponding to the total 





                                                
5.4 Data Description 
The purpose of estimating the competing-risks model is to validate Propositions 
1 and 2 and to assess the best reference price specification. The model was estimated 
using a sample of actual customer negotiations over the rental of a durable product. The 
propriety transaction database contains information about telephone call transactions 
between potential buyers and the seller. Buyers call to request information about the 
products and to rent a product. The buyer has the option to negotiate a lower price, but 
not everyone chooses to negotiate. Some of the non-negotiators purchase at the list 
price. If a negotiation occurs, only the seller makes explicit offers that the buyer either 
accepts or rejects. Hence, the dataset contains only asymmetric price negotiations.  
Negotiators are explicitly identified by an indicator variable. Approximately 14 
percent of the buyers in the sample negotiated over the purchase price. For transactions 
involving a negotiation, only the seller’s offer prices are recorded. A purchase indicates 
acceptance of the current offer price, whereas a non-purchase indicates rejection of the 
current offer price. A series of transactions with the same buyer over the same product 
in which negotiation occurs is considered to be an ongoing negotiation. Since the model 
assumes parties start in the negotiation state, only those individuals who negotiate are 
included in the model. The analysis sample of negotiators includes 3846 potential 
buyers, of which 235 eventually rent the durable product.25
 
25 In the subsequent discussion, buyers who rent are considered to have entered the purchase state.  
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Although a single transaction that ends in a non-rental is clearly identified, an 
entire negotiation that eventually ends in a non-rental is inferred using additional 
information in the database. The difficulty in identifying eventual transitions to the exit 
negotiation state arises from the possibility that negotiations are censored. Fortunately, 
a date-time “stamp” is associated with each transaction. The buyer’s desired rental date 
is also identified and is treated here as the buyer’s deadline. If the desired rental date 
occurs before the last date on file, then the negotiation has ended. If no rental has 
occurred for these negotiations, it is inferred that the buyer has entered the exit 
negotiation state. For some negotiations, the desired rental date occurs after the last date 
on file. If no purchase occurs for these negotiations, it is inferred that the negotiation 
duration is censored. Fortunately, censoring is not a major concern in this dataset, since 
it affects only 3% of the negotiations.26  
5.5 Offer Rate and Negotiation Cost 
Offer rate and negotiation cost are not directly observed. Instead, proxies are 
used. Since at least one offer is made during each telephone call, the actual number of 
offers is at least as large as the number of telephone calls. Also, the seller may set a 
higher offer rate for negotiations in which buyers face a shorter deadline. Consequently, 
the proxy for the offer rate is inversely proportional to the number of days until the 
buyer’s deadline. Therefore, the offer rate proxy is defined as the ratio of telephone 
 
26 In order to facilitate estimation and minimize the adverse effect of outliers, observations were removed 
that contained the top and bottom 1% from each variable’s distribution. Coincidently, no censored 
observations remained in the analysis sample after removing the outliers.  
calls (OFS) to the number of days until the buyer’s deadline (TDL), or
TDL
OFS
=λ . Note 
that for a given number of offers, the offer rate is large for a close deadline and small 
for a distant deadline. Moreover, since every day that passes without a rental represents 
an increasing opportunity cost to the buyer, negotiation cost increases for the buyer at a 
rate that is inversely and linearly proportional to the initial number of days until the 
buyer’s deadline (ITDL). Therefore, the negotiation cost proxy is defined 
as
ITDL
tcost(t) 1+=  , where t is the current duration (i.e., the number of days since the 
start of negotiation).27 Note that this proxy sets the initial negotiation cost (i.e., when 
t=0) to be small for distant initial deadlines and large for closer initial deadlines. Also, 
both proxies accommodate buyer heterogeneity because the deadline will depend on 
individual differences across buyers. Summary statistics for the variables used to 
estimate the empirical model are given in Table 3.28  
The table of summary statistics reveals several interesting characteristics of the 
dataset. On average, negotiation durations that end in a purchase (Mean = 5.33 days) are 
signficantly shorter (p<.001) than those that end in the potential buyer exiting 
negotiation without a purchase (Mean = 8.76 days). Shorter negotiation durations for 
purchasers may be a result of their lower reservation value or closer deadlines. The 
longer average offer rate (p<.001) for purchasers (Mean = .281) compared to those 
                                                 
27 Note that cost(t) is less than or equal to one since the negotiation duration must end prior to the desired 
delivery date. This characteristic of the negotiation cost ensures that the differential equation (18) has a 
unique solution (Edwards and Penny 1989). 
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28 The summary statistics appearing in Table 3 reflect the values after removal of the outliers.  
exiting negotiation (Mean = .198) is also consistent with the proposed model. Sellers 
who make more offers per unit of time to a potential buyer have more opportunities to 
meet the buyer’s reservation value. Consequently, buyers who purchase would be 
expected to have received offers at a higher rate than buyers who exit negotiation. 
 
Table 3  




 Overall (N=3846) 
Buyers Who Purchase 
(N=235) 
Buyers Who Exit 
Negotiation (N=3611) 
  Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Durationa 8.55 7.83 5.33*** 4.83 8.76 7.94 
Cost(t)b .372 .221 .363 .236 .372 .220 
Offer Rate .203 .255 .281*** .363 .198 .246 
InitialPricec $205.90 $192.56 $220.73 $157.41 $204.93 $194.61 
RecentPrice $256.74 $251.52 $181.11*** $163.93 $261.66 $255.43 
AveragePrice $147.97 $130.02 $152.66 $114.78 $147.67 $130.96 
 
a Duration is measured in days. 
b Negotiation cost is evaluated at the final negotiation duration. 
c The prices listed are relative offers. 
*** These differences between Buyers Who Purchase and Buyers Who Exit 
Negotiation are statistically significant at the p<.001 level 
 
 
Finally, consider the relative offers, i.e., the difference between the most recent offer 
price and a references price. When the reference price is RecentPrice, there is a 
significantly higher relative offer (p<.001) for buyers who exit negotiation (Mean = 
$261.66) compared to buyers who purchase (Mean = $181.11). This is consistent with 
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the second part of Proposition 2, since those who exit have longer negotiation durations. 
All other differences (i.e., for Cost(t), InitialPrice, and AveragePrice) are not 
statistically significant at the p=.05 level. 
5.6 Empirical Results 
 A competing-risks proportional hazard model is used to validate Propositions 1 
and 2 and to assess the best reference price specification. Although no specific 
hypotheses were given for transitions to the exit negotiation state, separate estimates for 
time, negotiation cost, offer rate, and offer value are included because many potential 
buyers (the majority) are observed to exit negotiation without a purchase. Furthermore, 
additional validation of the proposed model is provided if these effects are shown to 
depend on the terminal state. The competing-risks model is also used to explore 
alternative reference price specifications found in the negotiation literature. Also, these 
alternatives provide an informal test of the model’s robustness to alternative 
specifications of the relative offer. In particular, the generalizability of the model is 
supported if the propositions remain valid under alternative reference price 
specifications.  
5.7 Estimating the Marginal Effects 
 Since Propositions 1 and 2 express how the hazard changes with respect to a 
change in the structural parameters (e.g., negotiation cost), they are tested by 
considering the marginal effect of each structural parameter on the purchase hazard rate. 
For example, Proposition 1 states that the marginal effect of negotiation cost and time 
on the purchase hazard rate is positive, whereas Proposition 2 states that the marginal 
effect of the offer rate and the average relative offer on the purchase hazard rate is 
negative. Note that the marginal effect of time involves more than the simple effect of 
time, since negotiation cost is a function of time. The marginal effect of time on the 
purchase hazard rate is given by equation (23): 
 













⎛ += , 
 
where is given by equation (21) evaluated at the estimated coefficients and 
average attribute values. There is a statistically significant marginal effect of time 
if
),(ˆ iij Xtθ
{ 0,0: 20100 == }ββH is rejected and the sign of equation (21) is positive when 
evaluated at the average value of
ITP
1  and the other variables (Greene 2000). There is a 
statistically significant marginal effect for the negotiation cost if the hypotheses 
0: 200 =βH can be rejected in equation (7). There is a statistically significant marginal 
effect for the offer rate if the hypothesis 0: 300 =βH  can be rejected in equation (7). 
Unfortunately, the second part of Proposition 2 (i.e., the purchase hazard rate decreases 
with an increasing average relative offer) cannot be tested using the competing-risks 
model. This is because the parameter estimates are the same across all the buyers and 
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the proposition would require a separate parameter estimate for each buyer. The dataset 
used here contains insufficient information to estimate separate parameter estimates for 
each buyer.  
 The dataset was randomly partitioned into an estimation sample (80 percent) and 
holdout sample (20 percent). The estimation sample was used to estimate model 
parameters and test the model properties in Propositions 1 and 2. The holdout sample 
was used to compare the reference price specifications by assessing the best model fit. 
The estimates for the effects of time, negotiation cost, offer rate, and relative offer are 
reported for the estimation sample and grouped according to the transition state (buyers 
who purchase and buyers who exit negotiation). Three separate models are estimated 
corresponding to each of three alternative reference prices. Model performance is 
assessed using the Log-likelihood (LL) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
on the holdout sample. The parameter estimates for the three models and two transition 
states for the estimation sample are presented in Table 4. The corresponding marginal 
effects evaluated at the average values are presented in Table 5. The labels correspond 
to the reference prices defined in Table 2. 
 The results support Propositions 1 and the tested part of Proposition 2. As seen 
in Table 5, for every specification of reference price, the marginal effects of time and 
negotiation cost are positive and statistically significant (p<.001), as implied by 
Proposition 1. For every specification of reference price, the effect of the offer rate is 
negative and statistically significant (p<.001), as implied by Proposition 2. Therefore, 
both Proposition 1 and the tested part of Proposition 2 are completely supported by the 
empirical results. Although no specific hypotheses are given regarding the effect of the 
relative offers, the statistical significance of these effects validates the underlying 
assumption of the structural model that buyers value relative offers.  
 
Table 4  
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR COMPETING RISKS MODEL 
 
  Buyer Who Purchasea Buyer Who Exit Negotiation 
 Parameter InitialPrice RecentPrice AveragePrice InitialPrice RecentPrice AveragePrice
-5.35 -4.86 -5.30 -2.81 -2.73 -2.74Constant 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001)
-0.34 -0.33 -0.33 -0.17 -0.16 -0.17Time 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001)
11.22 11.13 11.11 9.68 9.65 9.65Neg.Costs 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001)
-4.24 -4.29 -4.17 -5.64 -5.63 -5.62Offer Rate 
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001)
0.0006 -0.0016 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003Relative 
Offer (.031) (<.001) (.288) (.255) (<.001) (.0193)
 
a P-values appear in parentheses. Each column corresponds to a model estimated using 
one of the three specifications of reference price (i.e., InitialPrice uses the list price as 
the buyer’s reference price, RecentPrice uses the most recent offer price as the buyer’s 










Table 5  
MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR COMPETING RISKS MODEL 
 
  Buyers Who Purchasea Buyers Who Exit Negotiation 
  InitialPrice RecentPrice AveragePrice InitialPrice RecentPrice AveragePrice
Time 0.000114 0.000134 0.000123 0.015161 0.015401 0.014896 
Neg.Costs 0.049185 0.051166 0.051077 0.986421 0.997215 0.966313
Offer Rate -0.018596 -0.019705 -0.019183 -0.574655 -0.581434 -0.562903
Relative Offer 0.000003 -0.000007 0.000002 0.000010 -0.000022 -0.000033
 
a The values correspond to the marginal effect of the independent variable (e.g., Time) 
on the transition rate evaluated at the parameter estimates and attribute averages. For 
example, for the marginal effect of Time on the purchase transition rate when the 
reference price in InitialPrice is given by .000114. 
ijθ̂
 
5.8 Comparing Reference Price Alternatives 
 A comparison of model fits using the three reference price alternatives appears 
in Table 6. Based on the results from the holdout sample, the model using the most 
recent price performs best (BIC = -4291.5), the model using the initial price performs 
second best (BIC = -4301.0), and the model using the average past price performs worst 
(BIC = -4302.9). This result suggests that the buyers in this dataset rely more on the 
most recent offer price in evaluating the relative offers than on the list price or average 
past offer price. This inference is further supported by the fact that the relative offer is 
not statistically significant when the reference price is defined as the AveragePrice 
(p=.288) and is marginally significant when the reference price is defined as the 
InitialPrice (p=.031). 
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 The results presented in Table 6 are consistent with the findings in the marketing 
literature on reference price (e.g., Briesch, Krishnamurthi, Mazumdar, and Raj 1997; 
Mayhew and Winer 1992), but are not consistent with some of the behavioral 
negotiation literature (e.g., Northcraft and Neale 1987; White and Neale 1996). One 
reason for this discrepancy may be that the results from the marketing literature are 
based on actual choice information whereas the results from the behavioral negotiation 
literature are based on simulated negotiations. In particular, laboratory simulations often 
either measure the subjects’ responses at the end of the negotiation or ask the subject to  
 
Table 6  
MODEL COMPARISONS USING ALTERNATIVE REFERENCE PRICES 
 
Estimation (N=3077) InitialPricea RecentPrice AveragePrice 
Log-Likelihood -9005.3 -8994.2 -9004.4 
BIC -17975.7 -17953.4 -17973.9 
Holdout (N=769) InitialPrice RecentPrice AveragePrice 
Log-Likelihood -2164.9 -2160.2 -2165.9 
BIC -4301.0 -4291.5 -4302.9 
 
a Each column corresponds to the competing-risks proportional hazard model estimated 
using the reference price indicated in the column heading (i.e., InitialPrice uses the list 
price as the buyer’s reference price, RecentPrice uses the most recent offer price as the 
buyer’s reference price, and AveragePrice uses the average of prior offer prices as the 
buyer’s reference price). 
 
make an evaluation after the negotiation has terminated. However, in actual 
negotiations, the parties evaluate offers as they arrive and may terminate at any point 
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during the negotiation. According to Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) this distinction is 
critical with respect to which reference point is used in evaluating the final offer. 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) show that when people are asked to evaluate a sequence of 
events at the end of the sequence, they tend to use the first event as a reference point.  
Hence, the results of Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) imply that in simulated 
negotiations, parties should use the list price as their reference price in evaluating 
successive offers. This was the result shown by Northcraft and Neale (1987) and White 
and Neale (1996). Alternatively, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) show that when the 
evaluation is done after each event in the sequence, a person tends to use the most 
recent event as the reference point. Hence, in actual negotiations, parties should use the 
most recent offer price as their reference price in evaluating successive offers. This 
result is shown in the present study. Similar results appear in the behavioral pricing 
literature that shows buyers often adapt their reference price as a product’s price 





6    Discussion  
This dissertation proposes a new model of asymmetric price negotiation between 
a buyer and a seller. The proposed model combines insights from several research 
streams to model a buyer’s decisions during negotiation. Several properties were 
derived from the proposed model. Analytical and empirical evidence indicates that as 
negotiation cost and time increase, the purchase hazard rate increases, but as the seller’s 
offer rate increases, the purchase hazard rate decreases. An analytic proof is given that 
the purchase hazard rate for a buyer decreases as the average relative offer for that 
buyer increases. Empirical validation of the proposed model was made by estimating a 
competing-risks proportional hazard model on a sample of actual negotiations over the 
rental of a durable good. The proposed model was shown to be robust to alternative 
specifications of reference price, although buyers were shown to rely more on the most 
recent offer price as a basis for evaluating relative offers.  
The proposed model offers several contributions to the negotiation literature. 
First, the proposed model extends prior marketing literature on negotiation by allowing 
the negotiation cost and reservation value to vary over time. Since prior research in 
marketing on negotiation assumes that these parameters are fixed over time, the 
proposed model subsumes previous models and is more realistic. Second, since the 
structural model easily leads to an empirically estimable model, the actual effect of a 
seller’s marketing decisions on negotiation outcomes can be precisely estimated. Prior 
negotiation research tends to rely on either experiments or game theory models, neither 
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of which provides an estimable model to measure the precise effects of negotiation cost, 
time, offer rate, or the relative offer on the negotiation process. Third, the proposed 
model clarifies the role that the buyer’s reference price has on the negotiation duration 
in the current dataset. Prior research has found conflicting evidence regarding which 
reference price dominates negotiation. Finally, the proposed model shows that a seller 
might decrease negotiation duration by decreasing the offer rate and average relative 
offer to potential buyers. Prior models do not predict negotiation duration.  
6.1 Managerial Implications 
The empirical results possess several managerial implications for the present 
study. The model shows that when negotiating over the rental price, a potential buyer 
will value an offer with respect to a reference price. In particular, buyers rely on the 
most recent offer price in evaluating a subsequent offer price. Consequently, in this 
instance, the seller should emphasize the savings from purchasing the product at the 
new offer price compared to the most recent offer price. Also, the model implies that 
the seller will have a better chance at reaching an agreement on the first day of 
negotiation for buyers who face an impending deadline. Buyers with close deadlines 
face a high initial negotiation cost that increases very rapidly. Consequently, the seller 
can leverage a buyer’s rapidly increasing negotiation cost by being less aggressive in 
lowering the offer price when the buyer is facing a close deadline. Finally, the structural 
model implies that a large average relative offer with a particular buyer will increase the 
negotiation duration with that buyer. A larger average relative offer means buyers face a 
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large discount with respect to their reference price. Over time, a larger average offer 
will increase a buyer’s reservation value, making it more difficult for the seller to 
satisfy the buyer’s purchase criterion. Consequently, the seller should be cautious in 
offering steep discounts over the duration of negotiation. In summary, the proposed 
model provides several guidelines for sellers that engage in asymmetric price 
negotiation.  
6.2 Limitations and Future Research 
The current study contains several potential limitations. Although the relative 
offer varies over time, the offer distribution is assumed to be stationary. This 
assumption was made to simplify the derivation of the structural model, but it might not 
always be realistic. For example, the offer distribution may change over time, reflecting 
the seller’s reactions to changing market conditions or inventory levels. Also, buyers 
might update their expectations about likely offers in response to changes in the 
information received during negotiation according to Bayes’s rule. In particular, the 
buyer may have a prior belief about likely offers and update these beliefs as the 
negotiation proceeds. 
The model assumes a buyer is risk-neutral so that utility is a linear function of 
its parameters. In general, a buyer may exhibit risk-seeking or risk-averse behavior. For 
example, Prospect Theory implies that a buyer will be risk-seeking or risk-adverse 
depending on how the buyer frames the negotiation with respect to a reference point. 
Suppose the buyer uses the average offer of other sellers d as the reference point. The 
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buyer may frame an offer dd < as a “loss” and exhibit risk-seeking behavior. Offers 
satisfying dd > may be perceived as a “gain”, inducing risk-adverse behavior. 
Furthermore, loss aversion implies that a perceived loss (i.e., dd < ) will have a greater 
effect on utility than a perceived gain (i.e., dd > ). One functional form for utility 
satisfying these assumptions is given by: 
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tl . The parameter γ captures 
the effect of loss aversion and the βα , parameters measure the level of risk-aversion and 
risk-seeking, respectively.  
The use of a general utility function changes the optimality constraint for the 
reservation offer. For example, in the stationary two-state model, the implicit function 
defining the reservation offer changes to: 
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 Another potential limitation is the assumption that the offer rate (λ ) is fixed 
over time. This too may not be realistic. For example, the seller may increase the offer 
rate as the buyer approaches his/her deadline in an attempt to entice the buyer to settle. 
Also, the model assumes everyone shares the same parameter values, e.g., λ is the same 
for all buyers. However, some parameters may vary across individuals. For example, 
the offer rate may depend on either observed (e.g., gender) or unobserved individual 
differences (e.g., bargaining power). If observed differences do not depend on time, 
they are easily incorporated into the basic model, e.g., )'( βλλ X= . 
Lancaster (1979) shows one way of modifying the static model to incorporate 
unobserved individual differences in the offer rate. If the hazard function has a 
“proportional form” )()()( 2 tXt ψλθ = , then Lancaster suggests )'exp()( βυλ XX i= for 
observed X and unobserved iυ . If , then the survival function 
conditional on X is given by: 
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the static model adequately accounts for some types of unobserved heterogeneity in the 
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offer rate. An alternative approach to modeling unobserved heterogeneity is to apply a 
hierarchical Bayes formulation. 
The optimality constraint (5) introduces several problems for estimating the 
negotiation model. First, since )(tξ  is a minimum value, the corresponding test statistics 
for )(tξ  are different from those used to test parameters in a standard maximum 
likelihood problem (cf. Flinn and Heckman 1982; Lancaster 1990). Most researchers 
sidestep these issues by assuming a specific functional form for )(tξ  (e.g., Lancaster 
and Chesher 1984; Van Den Berg 1990). A complementary approach is to apply 
Bayesian methods such as MCMC to sample from the posterior distribution of the 
parameters (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin 1995). In the static model, a Bayesian 
analysis is relatively straightforward due to the special form of the conditional 
distributions. In the Appendix, I sketch the method proposed by Lancaster (1997) to 
estimate the parameters of the static model using a Bayesian approach. 
The model presented in this study can be extended. The offer rate can be 
modeled as a source of unobserved heterogeneity since unforeseen individual 
differences (e.g., bargaining skill and experience) may alter the seller’s offer rate for 
particular buyers. The structural model could be augmented by placing a prior 
distribution on the offer rate. For example, since the offers are assumed to arrive in a 
Poisson process, a gamma prior distribution could be used to capture unobserved 
heterogeneity in the offer rate (Wagner and Decker 2000). Incorporating a prior 
distribution on the offer rate would help the model capture more of the dynamics of 
actual negotiations. Furthermore, incorporating unobserved heterogeneity might offer a 
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way to validate the negative effect of the average relative offer on the purchase hazard 
rate (i.e., the second part of Proposition 2). 
Finally, additional empirical studies should be conducted in order to further 
validate the structural model. The empirical model should be estimated using additional 
product categories and research conducted over different lengths of time. Also, data 
containing a more precise measure of the negotiation duration might overcome a 
potential limitation of this dataset, the fact that negotiations were initiated by a buyer’s 
telephone call to the seller. In the current dataset, suitable proxies existed for the 
negotiation cost and offer rate. However, the discount rate and its effect on negotiation 
duration are completely unobserved. Also, negotiation duration was an estimated value 
based on the time between the phone calls. Furthermore, the setting within which 
negotiations transpired was not observed and potential confounding affects were not 
controlled. For example, the buyer may have conversed with a friend or family member 
between the phone calls, influencing the buyer’s responses to the seller’s counter-offers. 
Although the dataset and model estimated thus far provide preliminary support for the 
proposed model and its properties, additional research is needed to validate these 
results. 
The deficiencies in the preliminary study can be overcome by manipulating the 
structural parameters and observing their effect on negotiation behavior in a controlled 
laboratory setting. An experiment can be conducted using human subjects who 
negotiate over the purchase of a product. In order to directly test the affect of 
negotiation costs, offer rate, and discount rate, subjects would negotiate in scenarios in 
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which these factors are directly manipulated. Also, the negotiation duration could be 
precisely measured since the participants negotiate in a controlled setting.  
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Appendix 
Stationary Model Distributions 
 Derivations for several of the probability distributions and optimality constraints 
are given below. First, consider the probability distribution for the number of rejected 
offers k, given the duration t and the accepted offer a. This is found by the observation 
that since the offers arrive in a Poisson process at the rateλ , the accepted and rejected 
offers arrive in independent Poisson processes with rates )( and )( ξλξλ FF , 
respectively. Therefore, if the first acceptable offer arrives at time t, then the number of 
rejected offers that arrive before t is also a Poisson process with rate )(ξλF : 
 








tFk ξλξλ . 
 
Next, consider the joint distribution for the number of rejected offers and duration, 
which is just the product : )()|( tgtkg
 








tkk λξξλ . 
 
Next, consider the distribution of rejected offers conditional on k, a and t. Denote the 









takr . Therefore: 
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The product of equation (A3) and equation (A1) is the joint distribution of rejection 
number and rejected offers: 
 




















Finally, the joint distribution of the accepted offer (a), rejected offers ( ), the 
number of rejections (k), and the duration (t) is given by the product of equation (A4) 
and equation (8): 
krr ,...,1
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Derivations from the Proposed Model 
It is shown that for exponential offers )exp(~)( rrf γγ , and linear negotiation 
cost c(t)=ct, the purchase hazard rate )()()( 21 xtt κκθ = , where )(1 tκ is a function 
common to all buyers and )(2 xκ is buyer-specific (i.e., )(tθ is a proportional hazard 
function). Also, the purchase hazard )(tθ is shown to increase with time and negotiation 
cost (Proposition 1), but decrease with the offer rate and the average relative offer 
(Proposition 2). 
Derivation of Purchase Hazard Rate 
The differential equation describing how the reservation value )(tξ  changes 
over time is given by the following expression: 
 










γγξλδδξξ .  
 












































, and equation (A14) becomes: 
 







Solving equation (A7) is made difficult by the exponential function. However, a power 
series expansion of the exponential function implies that ))(exp( tγξ− is approximated 
by )(1 tγξ− . Therefore, equation (A7) is approximated by the first-order linear 
differential equation given by (A8): 
 




d )()()( .    
 
This differential equation is solved using the integration factor ( )tt )(exp)( λδρ +−= . 














−=+− .  
 
Integrating both sides of expression (A9) and rearranging terms yields: 
 






+−−+−+= ∫ ∫ dttdttcttt )(exp)(exp)(exp)( λδγ
λλδδλδξ ) .  
 
Solving the integrals inside the right-hand parentheses yields:  
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Therefore, expression (A10) reduces to the following expression: 
 


















δλδξ ccttKt .  
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)( .] The hazard rate is given 
by ( )()( tSt )ξλθ = , which in light of equation (A11) can be written as: 
 

























γδλδγλθ ccttKt . 
  
Expression (A12) is in the form of a proportional hazard, which completes the proof.  
Proof of Proposition 1 
 Since the purchase hazard rate is given by ( ))()( tSt ξλθ = , )(tθ increases 
whenever )(tξ  decreases. Also, since negotiation cost is increasing in time, )(tξ  
decreases in negotiation cost whenever )(tξ  decreases in time. Therefore, in order to 
prove that )(tθ increases with time and negotiation cost, it suffices to show that )(tξ  
decreases with time.  
The proof that )(tξ decreases with time follows by first showing that )(tξ is 
monotonic and then showing that )(tξ is decreasing at a specific point, namely the 
deadline T. Recall, for exponential offers and linearly increasing negotiation cost, the 
reservation value )(tξ  is the solution to the following differential equation (where 
dt
tdt )()( ξξ =′ ): 
 94
 
(A13)    
γ
γξλδδξξ ))(exp()()( tcttt −−+=′ .    
 
Differentiating expression (A13) with respect to time t yields: 
 
(A14)   ( ))(exp)()()( ttctt γξξλδξδξ −′++′=′′ .    
 
Expression (A14) reduces to the following: 
 









δξ .   
 
The right-hand side is greater than zero since by assumption the discount and offer rate 









ξ . This 
implies that )(tξ is either monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing in time. 
Therefore, it is only necessary to consider the value of )(tξ at a specific point in time to 
determine whether it is increasing. Consider some point t~  that is close to the deadline 




ξ TcTT −+−= exp)( , for . Subtracting Tt ≥
)(Tξ  from )~(tξ yields: 
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~(exp~)~()~( TcTTttctt −+−−−−+=′  .  
 
Suppose that 0)( >′ tξ , which implies 0)()~( <− Tt ξξ and )()~( Tt γξγξ −>− . Since the 
exponential function is monotonically increasing, this implies that 
( ) ( ) 0)~(exp)(exp <−−− tT γξλγξλ . Furthermore, by definition negotiation cost is 
increasing and 1<δ , which implies that 0~ <− cTtcδ . Hence, the right-hand side of 
expression (A16) is negative, which contradicts the assumption that 0)( >′ tξ . A similar 
argument shows that 0)( ≠tξ . Therefore, it follows that 0)( <tξ , which completes the 
proof. Note that although this proof utilizes the assumption of exponential offers and 
linearly increasing costs, it can be easily generalized to any offer distribution and 
increasing cost function.  
Proof of Proposition 2 
 As in the proof to Proposition 1, the fact that the purchase hazard 
rate )(tθ decreases whenever )(tξ  increases is utilized. To show that )(tξ increases with 
the offer rateλ , consider the derivative of )(tξ  with respect toλ :  
 
(A17)  ( )


















td .  
 
Taking the derivative of (A17) with respect to time yields: 
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Now, taking the derivative of equation (A18) with respect toλ yields: 
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Since all of the parameters are positive (i.e., 0,,, >cK λδ ) and the exponential function 
is always positive, this implies that both the numerator and denominator of (A20) are 
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td , so that )(tξ  is increasing in the offer rate λ , which 
completes the proof for the case of an increasing offer rateλ . 
 Finally, the fact that )(tξ increases with the average relative offer follows from 
the properties of the exponential distribution and the expression for )(tξ  given by 
equation (A11): 
 


















δλδξ ccttKt .    
 
 In particular, when relative offers are exponentially distributed, the average relative 
offer is given by
γ
1 . However, equation (A11) is obviously increasing with respect to
γ
1 , 
which completes the proof for increases in the average relative offer. 
Bayesian Estimation of Static Model 
Lancaster (1997) proposes an MCMC method for sampling from the posterior of 
the parameters in the basic model (stationary parameters). The joint density for an 
individual observation is given by equation (A21): 
 













afetkarg λλ  
0 t;a 1,2,...;k ;,...,rfor 1 ≥≥=< ξξkr . 
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Using the notation from the previous section, the likelihood is comprised of the product 
of terms like (A21), and is given by: 
 



















































In the second part of (A22), is an offer (accepted or rejected). A buyer chooses iv ξ  by 
solving the optimality constraint: 
 





λξ dFdc . 
 
Let the distribution of offers have the lognormal distribution, or , so 
that in (A22), 
),(~log 2σµnvi
),( σµγ = . Note that the model parameters ),,,{ δσµλ are independent 
of each other. Lancaster chooses the improper prior )(1),,,( δπ
λσ
δσµλπ ∝ , so that 











































σλδσµλ λ . 
 
Expression (A23) suggests a way to transform the constraint involvingξ into a 
constraint involvingδ . In particular, rearranging terms in (A23) and using properties of 
),(~log σµnvi implies: 
 























The function ),,( σµξκ is monotonically increasing in its argument. Applying 











Lancaster samples from equation (A24) using the transformed constraint (A25) via the 
SIR (sampling/importance sampling) algorithm of Gelfand and Smith (1990). In 
particular, δ is integrated out of (A24) to get the marginal posterior distribution 
of ),,( σµλθ = : 
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(A27)   [ ]))(())(()()( θδπθδπθθ arrg −∝  





















σλ λ . 
 
After drawing from the marginal of ),,( σµλθ = , draws from the corresponding 
conditional posterior for δ are taken from: rag δδδδπθδ <<∝    ),()|( .This 
completes drawing samples from the joint posterior (A24). Note that the SIR procedure 
requires calculations of ra δδ ,  which are defined in terms of (A25). The integral in 
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